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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to systematically employ two explanatory 
theories as tools for the study of foreign policy and to test the two theories against 
one another to determine their relative explanatory power. This thesis investigates 
Russian Federation foreign policy regarding three contemporary issues, the "near 
abroad," the Kuril Islands dispute, and the current Bosnian conflict, by conducting 
an analysis of Russian policy statements and doctrine· in the period from the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the formation of the Russian Federation on 1 
January 1992 until August 1994. The analysis is based on hypotheses that seek to 
explain Russian foreign policy decisions, with reference to two theories: the concept 
of balance of power that emerges from political realism and the more recently 
developed concept of "strategic culture." 
v 
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EXECUTIVE SUMl\1ARY 
This thesis systematically employs two explanatory theories as tools for the 
study of foreign policy and tests the two theories against one another to determine 
their relative explanatory power. It investigates Russian Federation foreign policy 
regarding three contemporary issues by conducting an analysis of Russian policy 
statements and doctrine in the period from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
formation of the Russian Federation on 1 January 1992 until August 1994. The 
analysis is based on hypotheses that seek to explain Russian foreign policy decisions, 
with reference to two theories: the concept of balance of power that emerges from 
political realism and the more recently developed concept of "strategic culture." 
To test these theories, this thesis includes a comparative analysis of Russian 
foreign policy statements and documents which address three contemporary 
Russian foreign policy issues: the "near abroad," the Kuril Islands dispute with 
Japan, and the ethnic conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Policy statements made 
regarding these issues are examined first using a strategic culture approach, 
considering the history, traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, 
and symbols, determining which of these factors would most likely influence policy 
decisions, and what course of action such factors would most likely indicate. Then, 
the same issues are examined using an acultural, ahistorical perspective based on 
Realpolitik and the balance of power theory that emerges from it. 
Chapter I postulates the central questions of the thesis and introduces the 
three test cases. Chapter II discusses the candidate theories and the hypotheses 
derived from those explanatory theories that predict foreign policy behavior based 
upon those theories. Chapters ill, IV, and Veach examine one of the three test cases 
and conclude with an evaluation of the hypotheses based upon the Russian foreign 
policy statements made regarding the test case issues examined. Chapter VI 
evaluates the validity and the utility of the two theories as foundations for the 
analysis of contemporary Russian foreign policy decisions in the future, and weighs 
ix 
the relative explanatory power of each theory based on how well these respective 
hypotheses "performed" in the three test cases. These theories often predict 
different outcomes with respect to the nature and direction of foreign policy, so 
these test cases should be suggestive of the power of each theory. 
The results of the evaluation of the hypotheses in the three test cases indicate 
that balance of power theory is the clear "winner" when compared with strategic 
cultural theory. The hypotheses derived from the two explanatory theories (four 
from each) were evaluated across the three test cases, yielding a total of twelve 
evaluation points for the two theories. In the case of strategic culture, the 
hypotheses were upheld in six of twelve opportunities. By comparison, in the 
balance of power case the hypotheses were upheld in ten of twelve opportunities. 
The utility of balance of power theory, and to a lesser extent, strategic culture theory, 
as bases for such analysis have been confirmed by this thesis, which has focused 
largely on prediction and explanation. Additionally, from this study one may also 
draw a general conclusion regarding a characteristic of contemporary Russian 
foreign policy. 
The Russian Federation appears to be returning to the tsarist strategy of 
pursuing interests on both the Realpolitik and cultural level. Russian policy 
regarding Bosnia serves as an example of this type of "two-pronged" attack. Russian 
imperial foreign policy before 1917 pursued both great power interests of prestige 
enhancement and power aggrandizement, and yet at the same time cultivated 
cultural and historical interests in the region, on the basis of ethnic and religious 
ties. Today, Russia continues to emphasize its ethnic and religious connections 
with Serbia, and likewise asserts that the conflict in Bosnia simply cannot be 
resolved, and action cannot be taken, without consultation with Russia. Given the 
opportunity, Russia will pursue the achievement of its national interests in terms of 
both cultural/historical interests and Realpolitik-based calculations. 
However, the strong performance of the balance of power theory relative to 
strategic culture theory suggests the possibility that if Russian balance of power-
X 
based interests and strategic culture-based interests are in conflict, then Russia will 
sacrifice its cultural interests for the betterment of its balance of power interests. 
This was true in tsarist foreign policies, when in many instances Russia "traded" 
away the Serbs in treaties and negotiations in order to strengthen their position with 
respect to gaining control of the Turkish Straits and Constantinople. In 
contemporary Russian foreign policy, Russia has maintained that it must play a 
special role as the guardian-sponsor of Serbia, but its voting record in the U.N. and 
the C.S.C.E. regarding sanctions against Serbia indicate a tendency to follow Western 
policy and thereby enhance its standing in the international community. Prestige is 
not so well-defined as an attempt to gain control of the Turkish Straits, but it is 
nevertheless an important factor in the formulation of foreign policy in the Russian 
Federation-- more so than any culturally- or historically-based factor. The United 
States would do well to keep this in mind as it strives to understand Russian 
behavior in the post-Soviet era. 
xi 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past three years there have been astounding changes in the 
international order. Nowhere have these changes been more profound and more 
fundamental than in the former Soviet Union, and in its principal successor state, 
the Russian Federation. For the first time in Russia's long history, the country is 
taking meaningful steps toward the establishment of a democratic government 
founded on the precepts of Western liberal philosophy.l 
The purpose of this thesis is to systematically employ two explanatory 
theories as tools for the study of foreign policy and to test the two theories against 
one another to determine their relative explanatory power. In particular, it 
investigates Russian Federation foreign policy regarding three contemporary issues 
by conducting an analysis of Russian policy statements and doctrine in the period 
from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of the Russian Federation 
on 1 January 1992 until August 1994. The analysis is based on hypotheses that seek 
to explain Russian foreign policy decisions, with reference to two theories: the 
concept of balance of power that emerges from political realism and the more 
recently developed concept of "strategic culture." 
The potential utility of this latter concept, and on a more functional level, the 
influence that Russian domestic politics play on Russian foreign policy, are the 
compelling forces of this study. A number of international relations specialists and 
historians have applied this "unit-level" approach and have discussed strategic 
culture in their studies of Russian, and in particular, Soviet history.2 But in light of 
lThe word "meaningful" is in this instance chosen with great care. There are 
analysts who argile that Russia has previously engaged in democratic reform, 
specifically in the first years of the 20th century. This notion will be considered in 
Chapter II. See discussion on page 18. 
2There are, for example, the following examinations of Soviet strategic 
culture: David R. Jones, "Soviet Strategic Culture," in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed., Strategic 
Power: USA/ USSR (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990) and Yitzhak Klein, ''The 
1 
recent monumental developments -- the stunning demise of the Soviet Union -- it 
is appropriate to pose the question again: is this unit-level approach useful in the 
post-Soviet era? Strategic culture provided an important and useful foundation for 
analysis of Soviet foreign policy. This thesis examines whether or not strategic 
culture is useful in analyzing post-Soviet Russian foreign policy. To test this 
notion, this thesis includes a comparative analysis of Russian foreign policy 
statements and documents which address three contemporary Russian foreign 
policy issues: the "near abroad," the Kuril Islands dispute with Japan, and the ethnic 
conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Policy statements made regarding these issues will 
be examined first using a strategic culture approach, considering the history, 
traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, and symbols and 
determining which of these factors would most likely influence policy decisions, 
and what course of action such factors would most likely indicate. Then, the same 
issues will be examined using an acultural, ahistorical perspective based on 
Realpolitik and the balance of power theory that emerges from it.3 
The study of cultural development and the lessons of history of a particular 
state can often yield a clearer understanding of the foreign policies of that state. But 
how does the understanding developed through the study of a state's strategic 
culture compare with an examination of state foreign policy based on a more 
abstract theory? More to the point, would the study of Russian strategic culture shed 
Sources of Soviet Strategic Culture," The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, vol. 2 
(December 1989). For studies of domestic factors of Soviet foreign policy, see Morton 
Schwartz, The Foreign Policy of the USSR: Domestic Factors (Encino, CA: 
Dickenson Publishing Company, Inc., 1975); sections from Erik P. Hoffman and 
Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., eds., The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Aldine 
Publishing Company, 1980). Remarkably, there are even pertinent sections in the 
venerable but still relevant lvo Lederer, ed., Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in 
Historical Perspective (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962). 
3The organization of this thesis is based upon a similar approach used by 
Barry S. Posen in The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany 
Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984). 
2 
significant light on contemporary Russian foreign policy, or would a reliance on a 
theory derived from classical realism, namely balance of power theory, provide a 
better explanation of Russian foreign policy than theories derived from strategic 
culture? In examining Russian foreign policy statements in recent months 
regarding these three issues, which perspective provides better insight into the 
process of Russian foreign policy formation? This comparison is, at a basic level, 
between unit-level theories that have been developed in an effort to understand the 
nature of policy determination. Specifically, this is a comparison of strategic culture 
and balance of power in an effort to determine the utility of using this recently-
developed concept, strategic culture, as a foundation for analyzing Russian foreign 
policy. There are other theories at the unit-level and the system level which could 
provide a basis for analysis of Russian foreign policy. These candidate theories are 
discussed in Chapter II. 
A comprehensive evaluation of Russian foreign policy using all available 
theories is well beyond the scope of this thesis. 4 Setting aside the large number of 
theories available, the main focus of this thesis remains the examination of the 
utility of strategic culture and balance of power as bases for analysis. These two 
theories are expansive in nature and provide ample foundations for the 
development of testable hypotheses which attempt to explain Russian foreign policy 
decisions. This work is not an exhaustive study of all contemporary Russian foreign 
policy issues. Rather, it is illustrative in nature, with the hope that it sparks interest 
in further examination and application of the comparative analysis of the two 
theories utilized here. 
4A vailable theories that can be used to evaluate foreign policy include the 
following: strategic culture, balance of power, organizational process, government 
(bureaucratic) politics, and domestic politics. Certain systemic theories -- structural 
realism (or neorealism), hegemonic power, and cycles of domination must also be 
taken into account. 
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The confusion and ambiguity that encompasses the term Realpolitik must be 
acknowledged; it is fraught with contradicting definitions and applications. This 
concept is discussed and defined in Chapter II. 
The term strategic culture is of fairly recent origin; as with Realpolitik there is 
considerable disagreement concerning the definition and the applicability of the 
term. The extended application of the concept of strategic culture may, however, be 
useful in examining the foreign policy decisions of a state, and in many cases 
provide a better explanation for the conduct of foreign policy than does a direct 
realist interpretation. Discussion and definition of this term likewise follows in 
Chapter II. 
In the process of analyzing Russian foreign policy, it may well be that these 
two concepts are complementary rather than contradictory. Both may provide 
insight that will contribute to a greater understanding of the subject. It is very 
possible that in some cases, the Realpolitik factors may provide greater 
understanding, while in other cases the strategic culture factors may prove of greater 
utility. Nevertheless, in the interest of evaluating the usefulness of strategic culture 
in studying Russian foreign policy, this analysis is comparative. As Barry Posen 
states, 
The competitive application of the two theories is analogous to 
the use of different lenses, tools for the apprehension of reality. By 
using two explicit theories, each of which highlights the influence of 
different causes, we can gain a more focused understanding of [foreign 
policy]. Each theory allows us to view some aspects of the same 
phenomenon more clearly (albeit at the cost of reducing the visibility 
of other aspects.)S 
In setting up a competitive relationship between strategic culture and balance 
of power, the analysis follows Alexander L. George's "method of structured, focused 
SPosen, p. 8. 
4 
comparison."6 In this method, George demonstrates how the standpoint of the 
political scientist can be combined with that of the historian in employing a strategy 
of controlled comparison for the development of theory. Aspects of the historian's 
intensive, detailed explanation of a particular case study is combined with the 
political scientist's ability to conceptualize the requirements of theory and procedure 
in scientific inquiry: George's method represents a rejoining of the two disciplines. 7 
Regarding the period in question, a comparative analysis of Russian foreign 
policy using balance of power and strategic culture was chosen for the following 
reasons. First, this period is one in which Russia underwent dramatic changes at 
the political, social and economic levels, which produced changes in the 
fundamental structure and organization of government. In a relatively brief period 
of time, Russia abandoned socialist ideology and embraced the precepts of Western 
liberal thought, and instituted genuine democratic reform. Yet, in this period of 
dramatic transformation in which the old political ideology was swept away, the 
new government was still in its formative state. All the assumptions of generations 
of Soviet citizens and ruling elite were rendered invalid; in such a period of 
traumatic transition and uncertainty, the only remaining foundation by which old 
Soviets, now "new" Russians, could gain a frame of reference would be the "near-
constants of culture."8 Thus this period provides an excellent test for determining 
the validity of strategic culture as a basis for foreign policy formation and analysis. 
6 Alexander George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of 
Structured, Focused Comparison," in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New 
Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 43-68. 
7Ibid., p. 61. 
BThis is a potentially difficult term. The point must be made, however: 
strategic culture does not claim to predict an unchanging, monolithic foundation for 
policy formulation. Cultures do change, but these changes are very gradual, and 
there is a predilection to avoid change that makes it fairly easy to predict what sort of 
foreign policy a nation might pursue on the basis of its unique historical experience. 
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Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union signaled the end of the Cold vVar 
and the bi-polar superpower structure that dominated the international system in 
the four decades that followed World vVar II. Stripped of this superpower status and 
with all its former allies in a similar state of upheaval, the question of whether the 
Russian Federation would pursue a balance of power-based policy, with a goal of 
building new alliances and regaining lost prestige, is a valid one. This situation, 
then, also serves to test the validity of applying balance of power theory analysis to 
the post-Soviet era of Russian foreign policy. 
The "near abroad" is appropriate as a subject of Russian contemporary foreign 
policy analysis because of its expansiveness and preeminence. It is the most 
complex test case in this analysis, and in all of Russian foreign policy. It dominates 
discussion of Russian national interests in the realm of foreign policy. By 
addressing this expansive issue a great deal of the smaller, regional issues may be 
better understood: the Baltics, Ukraine, the Caucasus, Central Asia. Analyses of any 
of these regional issues must be understood in light of broader Russian perspectives, 
and would therefore necessarily require analysis of the "near abroad" policies. In 
the eyes of Russians, the "near abroad" represents a previously inconceivable loss of 
territory, and with that a loss of power and prestige. Historically, Russian policy in 
these regions has included important elements of both strategic culture and 
Realpolitik. The purpose in this test case is to understand which application of 
these theories have a more profound impact on contemporary Russian foreign 
policy. This case provides a specific test for several of the hypotheses: Hypothesis 1, 
which concerns security and a loss of strategic depth; Hypothesis 2, which concerns 
the pursuit of secure borders by expansion; Hypothesis 3, which considers the appeal 
to nationalistic sentiments as a means of garnering support for a certain policy; and 
Hypothesis 7, which concerns the reaction of a state to territorial loss. 
The Kuril Islands dispute with Japan is a much smaller scale issue than the 
"near abroad"; that alone makes it attractive for analysis. The Kuril dispute is also 
completely distinct from the "near abroad" issue; there is no overlap between the 
6 
two issues. Having tested the application of these theories on a grand scale (the 
"near abroad"), it is interesting to see how they perform in a relatively small, 
regional issue. Additionally, the "near abroad" concerns territory won by the 
Russians by guile or by conquest in the centuries before 1989, and then lost in the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. In contrast, the Kurils are territory obtained in the 
recent past, relatively speaking, and which are still held by the Russians. Thus at 
issue in the Kurils is the Russian attempt to maintain territory in their possession, 
rather than an attempt to regain lost territory. This case provides a specific test for 
Hypothesis 6 regarding the "conditionally expansionist" tendency of foreign policy, 
with regard to maintaining access to the sea. 
Lastly, the Kurils are an issue completely outside the European sphere. 
Volumes have been written debating the place of Russia within or without the 
European system; the purpose of this thesis is not to join that debate. However, in 
the interest of avoiding charges of a Eurocentric study, analysis of the Kurils 
provides an important indication of the applicability of these theories in areas 
outside traditional European interests. 
While Russian claims to interests in the Kurils on the basis of "prior 
discovery, prior settlement and prior development"9 may be viewed as an attempt 
to justify a recently developed interests in resource exploitation and strategy, are 
therefore open to debate, there can be no disputing that Russia has maintained a 
longstanding interest in the Balkans. There are strategic culture and Realpolitik 
elements to this interest. In light of the revolutionary changes in the political and 
governmental structure in Russia, it is interesting to consider which of these 
elements have a stronger influence on contemporary Russian policy regarding the 
ethnic strife in Bosnia-Hercegovina. It can be argued that the Russians have h~d a 
long term interest in cultivating close ties with the South Slavic peoples for cultural 
reasons: the sense of ethnic and spiritual kinship, and the quest for Slavic unity. 
Likewise, it can also be argued that Russian interest is based principally on the desire 
9See discussion in Chapter IV. 
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to cultivate prestige by the development of alliances or the exertion of influence, 
and to gain access to the Turkish straits by gaining control of the adjacent territory. 
The current Bosnian conflict provides a tough test of strategic culture (which 
explains Russia's pro-Serbian position) versus Realpolitik (which would explain 
Russia's attempts to accommodate the Western demands for punitive actions 
against the Serbs). 
This case serves as a test for specific hypotheses as well: Hypothesis 3, 
concerning the appeal of nationalistic sentiment; Hypothesis 5, concerning prestige; 
and Hypothesis 8, concerning the pursuit of "balance" in the international order. 
Chapter II will offer brief surveys of balance of power theory and strategic 
culture theory, and will develop hypotheses from these theories about the nature of 
foreign policy. Other theories will be discussed in this chapter as well. The next 
three chapters examine the three test cases used in this analysis to examine 
contemporary Russian foreign policy: the "near abroad" in Chapter III, the Kuril 
Islands dispute in Chapter IV, and the conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina in Chapter V. 
Each of these chapters opens with a historical survey of the subject foreign policy 
issue as it has related to Russian and Soviet foreign policy up to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, then the current Russian Federation foreign policy position on the 
subject issue is examined in greater detail, using foreign policy-related statements by 
Russian officials and documents pertinent to the issue. At the close of each of these 
three chapters the hypotheses developed in Chapter II are evaluated to determine if 
they were upheld or not upheld, based upon the determined foreign policy position 
of the Russian Federation. 
Chapter VI evaluates the validity and the utility of the theories as 
foundations for the analysis of contemporary Russian foreign policy decisions. in the 
future, and weighs the relative explanatory power of each theory based on how well 
two families of hypotheses "performed" in the three test cases. These theories 
frequently predict different outcomes with respect to the nature and direction of 
foreign policy, so these test cases are suggestive of the power of each theory. It is 
8 
hoped that this thesis will demonstrate the utility of at least one, and possibly both, 
explanatory theories in evaluating contemporary Russian foreign policy regarding a 
wide variety of issues. 
9 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS: THE COMPETING THEORIES 
AND THE DERIVED HYPOTHESES 
Before proceeding with an examination of recent Russian foreign policy 
regarding the near abroad, certain terms and concepts must be defined. 
A. STRATEGIC CULTURE 
1. Theory Discussion and Definition 
In the absence of knowledge concerning an adversary or potential adversary, 
and in the face of the demand for a decision based upon the predicted actions of that 
adversary, the easiest and indeed the most likely approach to deductive reasoning is 
to project one's own belief system, value system, logic, knowledge -- in short one's 
own cultural biases -- on the adversary. Such an conceptualization, the so-called 
process of "mirror imaging," was evident when American strategists and academics 
conducted studies of Cold War strategies under the assumption that the Soviets 
thought in the same way as Americans.1 In the course of the 1970's it became 
obvious that the Soviets had devised a nuclear strategy that was very different from 
the corresponding U.S. strategy. Western students of Soviet nuclear strategy 
eventually discovered that the Soviets had a different understanding of deterrence. 
The Soviets rejected the notion of self-restraint in deploying counter-force weapons, 
and were instead determined to try to fight and win a nuclear war. American 
doctrine counted on the feasibility of fighting a limited nuclear war in a way that the 
lExamples of prominent works that advocate this position are Alain C. 
Enthoven and KQ Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough: Shaping the Defense · 
Program, 1961-1969 (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1971); Roman Kolkowicz, et al., 
The Soviet Union and Arms Control-- A Superpower Dilemma (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University, 1970); and, Jerome H. Kahan, Security in the Nuclear 
Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy (Washington, D. C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1975). These latter two works, and the underlying premise of similar 
American and Soviet nuclear strategies, are discussed in Colin S. Gray, Nuclear 
Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986). See pp. 137-138. 
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Soviet approach rejected.2 This led to the introduction of the concept of "strategic 
culture," which sought to account for the difference in American and Soviet 
strategies in the field of nuclear war and deterrence. Its application was 
subsequently expanded and has since been widely debated. The question of whether 
strategic culture is useful in a broader analysis of foreign policy is at the heart of this 
thesis. 
The term "strategic culture" was first used by Jack Snyder in a RAND 
Corporation paper published in 1977. In this paper, Snyder stated: 
It is useful to look at the Soviet approach to strategic thinking as 
a unique "strategic culture." Individuals are socialized into a distinctly 
Soviet mode of strategic thinking. As a result of this socialization 
process, a set of general beliefs, attitudes and behavioral patterns with 
regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a state of semi-permanence that 
places them on the level of "culture" rather than mere "policy." Of 
course, attitudes may change as a result of changes in technology and 
the international environment. However, new problems are not 
assessed objectively. Rather, they are seen through the perceptual lens 
provided by the strategic culture.3 
Ironically, in the years since he introduced this concept, Snyder has joined 
some of his critics and has turned on theorists who have expanded the concept of 
strategic culture and the application of the term. Snyder argues that the concept was 
valid only within the realm of an examination of the difference between Soviet and 
American approaches to nuclear strategy. The concept serves as a "warning of the 
danger of ethnocentrism." Snyder has decried theorists such as Ken Booth who 
underrate the prospects for change in Soviet strategy by exaggerating the differences 
between American and Soviet strategic thinking and ignoring the potential for 
2Jack Snyder, ''The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor," in Carl G. 
Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London, Macmillan, 1990), p. 3. 
3Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear 
Operations (Santa Monica, CA: Rand R-2154-AF, September 1977), p. v. 
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changes in the objective internal or external environment of the Soviet Union.4 
Booth is one theorist who has greatly expanded the application of the concept, and 
his definition of strategic culture is notably broader than Snyder's: 
The concept of strategic culture refers to a nation's traditions, 
values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements 
and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving 
problems with respect to the threat or use of force. [It is] persistent over 
time ... [it is derived from that nation's] history, geography and 
political culture, and it represents the aggregation of the attitudes and 
patterns of behavior of the most influential voices: these may be ... the 
political elite, the military establishment and/ or public opinion [and 
including domestic politics] ... Strategic culture helps shape behavior 
in such issues as the use of force, international politics, sensitivity to 
external dangers, civil-military relations and strategic doctrine.s 
Concerning the definition of strategic culture, Alistair I. Johnston addressed 
the subject as follows: different states have different predominant strategic 
preferences that are rooted in the "early" or "formative" military experiences of the 
state, and are influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural and 
cognitive characteristics of the state and the state elites as these develop through 
time. Strategic culture does not reject rationality; rather, it rejects the ahistorical, 
acultural structural or neo-realist framework for analyzing strategic choices. 
Included in this concept of strategic culture is the notion that strategic preferences of 
a state are rooted in history and culture.6 
Yitzak Klein gave the following definition of strategic culture: "the set of 
attitudes and beliefs held within a military establishment concerning the political 
4Snyder, "The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor," p. 8. 
SKen Booth, "The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed," in Carl G. Jacobsen, 
ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan,1990), p. 121. Parenthetical 
phrase regarding domestic politics added. 
6Alastair I. Johnston, unpublished ms., December 1993, pp. 1-3. 
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objective of war and the most effective strategy and operational method of 
achieving it."7 This may serve as a starting point, but it is nonetheless unnecessarily 
limited in its scope. For Klein, the concept is only valid in the realm of military 
thought, but this is not a foregone conclusion. There is much to be said for the 
inclusion of other elements of a society as influential forces in the formulation of a 
strategic culture. The most notable of these elements is the political elite, which was 
addressed to some extent by Johnston and Booth; another is the mass public, 
especially the informed portion of it. These latter concepts, the political elite and the 
mass (or general) public, are important categories in the study of influential 
elements in a society and are defined and explored at length by Herbert McClosky 
and John Zaller.s McClosky and Zaller define the political elite as a body of people 
from within the mass public who are able exert a disproportionate influence on 
public opinion by virtue of their political activity or knowledge. The political elite 
are also known as "opinion leaders" or "influentials."9 
Regarding the analysis of Russian foreign policy, the broader application of 
the concept of strategic culture appears more useful, although the limitations of this 
thesis require a corresponding limitation in the bounds of the definition. This study 
makes the admittedly artificial simplifying assumption that the impact of strategic 
culture is homogeneous across the spectrum of society. Under this assumption, 
therefore, the political elite, the military establishment, the informed public, and the 
general public all experience the same influence produced by that society's strategic 
culture. For the purpose of this analysis, therefore, the following definition of 
strategic culture is employed, drawing primarily from Booth's definition: 
7Yitzhak Klein, "A Theory of Strategic Culture," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 
10, No.1, 1991, p. 5. 
SHerbert McClosky and John Zaller, The American Ethos: Public Attitudes 
toward Capitalism and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1984). 
9Ibid., p. 13. 
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Strategic culture is a sum total of a state's traditions, values, 
attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, and particular ways of adapting 
to the geopolitical environment and solving problems. All of these 
factors must persist over time, and are derived from the state's history, 
geography, and political culture. 
Before examining the nature of Russian strategic culture today and given the 
close relationship between strategic culture and historical experience, it would be 
useful to consider some general observations regarding tsarist and Soviet foreign 
policy. 
The following summary of tsarist foreign policy emerges from a review of the 
period from the rise of Ivan the Terrible in 1533 to the abdication of Nicholas II in 
1917. Obviously, these observations are necessarily broad and general in their scope. 
(1) As a result of Russia's particular geographic borders and constraints, the 
first and preeminent goal of tsarist foreign policy was the security of the empire. 
The term "security" is somewhat elusive, but in this particular application, national 
security will be defined as a set of policies pursued by a nation in order to "protect 
itself from the possibility of attack."lO Russia had been invaded numerous times, 
and was particularly vulnerable to attack from the southeastern steppes, from what 
is presently Poland, and -- early on -- from a Swedish threat to the west. This led to a 
heightened sense of vulnerability and a corresponding quest for strategic borders. 
That is to say, the geographic extent of Russian influence was characterized by a lack 
of natural geographic boundaries-- physical features that were conducive to defense. 
Given this lack of natural physical boundaries, as Russia grew in power and 
influence it sought to expand its borders, thereby pressing the frontiers away from 
the heartland and gaining control of "natural borders." Such geographic 
characteristics included mountain ranges (as in the Caucasus), large and unfordable 
lOMichael Mandelbaum, The Fate of Nations (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), p. 1. 
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rivers (such as the Fruth or the Danube), and seas (such as the Black, Baltic, and 
Caspian Seas). 
(2) In its quest for those strategic borders, Russia pursued a policy of territorial 
expansion. Russia's first step in stabilizing its periphery was to acquire defendable 
borders, a process that was achieved by the political or military reduction of states 
surrounding the empire.ll Consequently, successive tsars came to comprehend the 
defensive concept of security based upon the notion of territorial depth.12 
Subsequently, some argue, the Russian quest for security evolved into expansion for 
its own sake.13 
(3) The drive for territory was often rationalized by dynastic, religious or 
national claims of Russian messianism or superiority.l4 Initially, ideology provided 
a key motivational factor in the establishment of foreign policy objectives. 
However, as the tsarist state became more institutionalized, these objectives became 
more pragmatic and more closely resembled a traditional foreign policy. 
(4) As the Russian Empire expanded, its multi-national character reenforced 
the need for a strong, centralized, authoritarian rule.lS Additionally, as the empire 
expanded, the newly acquired lands were saturated with Russian settlers who 
llCyril E. Black, "The Pattern of Russian Objectives" in Ivo J. Lederer, ed., 
Russian Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 3-38. 
12Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since War II: Imperial and 
Global (Boston: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989), p. 10. 
13Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 1-40. 
14Ibid., p. 18. 
15For examples of the development of the pattern of authoritarian rule in the 
Russia Empire, see the descriptions of institutional development in each of the 
tsarist regimes in Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), p. 66. 
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upheld tsarist rule and prevented other nationalities from gaining strength enough 
to overthrow or conquer the empire.16 
(5) Survival of the state was tantamount to survival of the individual, a 
notion quite different from the Western society, in which the ideals of individual 
rights and responsibility emerged paramount. 
Russia developed as an empire because of its fundamental need to expand in 
order to become secure. This expansionist argument is not a argument unique to 
Russian history: Napoleon and Hitler used a similar line of reasoning. But France 
and Germany were well-established nation-states prior to the rise of these 
charismatic, messianic leaders. What makes the Russian case unique is that the 
expansionist approach to security developed coincident with the foundation of the 
modern Russian political entity that threw off the "Tatar yoke" under the 
leadership of the first Tsar of united Russia, Ivan IV, in 1533.17 The bottom line of 
tsarist foreign policy as it developed was the need to preserve and strengthen the 
empire. Strategic considerations were always preeminent; economic development 
and expansion were secondary;18 individual considerations were tertiary, at best. 
Turning to a summary of Soviet foreign policy that emerges from studies of 
the period from 1917 until 1991, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
(1) Security was the first objective in Soviet foreign policy. In tsarist days the 
risk of threat was predominantly a threat of invasion by military force. While that 
threat remained a possibility after the Bolshevik Revolution, the Bolsheviks 
16For an account of the migratory trends and the methods of colonizations 
used by Russians in their expanding empire, see Alexandre Henningsen, "The 
Muslims of European Russia and the Caucasus," in Wayne S. Vukovich, ed., Russia 
and Asia (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), pp. 138-139. 
17fhe date of the end of Mongol or Tatar domination has been set at various 
dates, based upon the assent to the Muscovite throne of various leaders from Ivan 
III (1462), to Basil Til (1505), to Ivan IV. See Riasanovsky, p. 66. 
lBRubenstein, p. 10. 
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introduced an ideological aspect to the definition through ideology -- the 
competition of socialism and capitalism. After 1917, security included both military 
and ideological considerations. This leads to a second point. 
(2) Ideology played a crucial role in the development of foreign policy, at least 
in the formative years of the Soviet Union. As the Soviet state became more 
institutionalized, these objectives became more pragmatic and more closely 
resembled a traditional foreign policy. Nonetheless, an ideological element 
remained in the U.S.S.R.'s foreign policy throughout its history. George F. Kennan 
described it as an "innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism."19 There 
was always a sense of rivalry, and the Soviets never got over the siege mentality that 
was spawned by notions of "capitalist encirclement." 
(3) In its quest for security and ideological supremacy, the Soviet Union 
pursued an expansionist policy. It engaged in a perpetual drive for influence and 
global recognition,20 and the basis for this drive to expand was ideology -- the rise of 
socialism on the heels of the anticipated collapse of capitalism. Initially, ideology 
provided a key motivational factor in the establishment of foreign policy objectives. 
(4) As was the case with its tsarist predecessor, as the Soviet empire expanded, 
its increasingly multi-national character reenforced the need for a strong, 
centralized, authoritarian rule. As the processes of collectivization and 
industrialization were initiated, took hold and developed, the recently acquired 
territory in Central Asia and the Caucasus was saturated with Russians who 
19X [George F. Kennan], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," in Hamilton Fish 
Armstrong, ed., The Foreign Affairs Reader (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), 
pp. 465-483. 
20Rubenstein, p. 14. 
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prevented other nationalities from gaining strength enough to overthrow the 
Soviet regime.21 
(5) The Soviet foreign policy formation process was highly centralized. Policy 
decisions were made by very few men, and largely without regard to the interests of 
the general population as a whole. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other 
institutions were relegated to support status. 
(6) The Soviet system was committed to the preservation of the imperial 
system and its sole regard for the outside world was the significance it had in 
preserving, strengthening and expanding its own system.22 
The summary of Soviet foreign policy is remarkably similar to that of tsarist 
foreign policy: ideology aside, the primary purpose of Soviet foreign policy was to 
preserve and strengthen the Soviet system;23 and again, secondary considerations 
were the protection and strengthening of the economy, and expansion, while 
individual rights and responsibilities were suppressed outright. 
Based on the discussion of tsarist and Soviet foreign policy and the 
assumption that a "new" Russian foreign policy will be heavily influenced by 
historical precedents, the following foreign policy objectives may be appropriate for 
the Russian Federation: 
(1) As in previous eras, security remains the first and preeminent goal of 
Russian foreign policy. In this context it is important to realize that Russia's 
geopolitical parameters have been reduced and its strategic situation has changed. 
Russia still occupies borders that are contiguous with China, but only in the vast 
open regions of the Russian Far East. In Europe, Russia no longer occupies states or 
21Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: Little,· 
Brown & Co., 1961). See in particular Chapter 17, "Stalin as a Statesman," pp. 241-
259. 
22Ibid., p. 253 et passim. 
23Kennan, Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1941 (Westport, Cf: Greenwood Press, 
1960). See the discussion of Stalin's "divide and rule" tactics. 
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territories that are adjacent to territories protected by the United States (which is to 
say, vVestern Europe).24 In the Soviet period the Red Army directly controlled the 
regions abutting territory occupied by its greatest rival. Today, there are "grey zones" 
of uncertain power and stability surrounding Russia, separating it from the other 
major powers. 
(2) In the past, Russia pursued an expansionist policy in a quest for strategic 
frontiers. As a first step toward stabilizing its periphery, Russia acquired defendable 
borders through the political or military reduction of· states surrounding the empire. 
Russia has not yet undertaken so bold a course of action as outright re-annexation, 
but there are observers who believe that Russia will use a revitalized 
Commonwealth of Independent States for the same function. 
Likewise, there are concerns regarding the potential for unilateral Russian 
actions in the periphery. The new Russian military doctrine has been as a source of 
considerable concern to the other former Soviet republics. The first draft of this 
document appeared in the Russian press in May 1992, and key provisions of this 
draft included the continued placement of Moscow at the center of a unified CIS 
defense space, the justification of force to defend ethnic Russians in the "near 
abroad," and a suggestion that Eastern Europe and the other former Soviet states 
remained in a distinctly Russian sphere of influence.25 The final draft of the new 
defense policy was approved by the Russian Federation Security Council on 2 
November 1993, but has not been published.26 Additional aspects of this new 
defense policy are discussed in Chapter ill. 
24Alexei G. Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," International 
Security, Vol. 18, No.2 (Fall1993), p. 6. 
25'fhe text of this draft document appeared in Voennaya mysl (special issue), 
May 1992. See Stephen Foye, "Updating Russian Civil-Military Affairs," Radio Free 
Europe I Radio Liberty Research Report (hereafter, RFE I RL Research Report), Vol. 2, 
No. 46, 19 November 1993, pp. 44-50. 
261bid., p. 48. 
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(3) In the past, ambition reenforced the drive for security and the subsequent 
attachment to empire, and the drive for territory was often pursued on the basis of 
Russian dynastic, religious or nationalistic claims. Today's preoccupation with 
Russia~s status as a "great power" and its claims of "special interests" in these 
regions indicate a continuing Russian ambition. 
(4) In previous eras, ideology provided the initial motivation in the 
establishment of foreign policy objectives. Today, nationalism could easily serve as 
the ideological driving force behind the development of foreign policy objectives. 
Here is necessary to pause and very briefly discuss the nature of nationalism 
in general, and Russian nationalism in particular. Nationalism, by Gellner's 
account, is a political principle which holds that a political unit (state) and its 
corresponding national (ethnic) unit must be congruent; nationalism is the belief 
that nation and state are destined to unite.27 Joy or anger results when this destiny 
is correspondingly fulfilled or thwarted. It is important to note that in this broad 
definition nationalism it is not necessarily an expansionist phenomena. However, 
George F. Kennan has enumerated two separate and distinct forms of Russian 
nationalism: a "traditional" nationalism that developed relatively early in the 
formation of the Russian nation and was firmly embedded in the teachings of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, and a newer "linguistic" nationalism, which was secular 
27Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1991). This is, of course, but one definition of nationalism. 
Walker Connor considers the identification of nationalism with the state to be 
imprecise and preemptive. His argument is that nations and states frequently do 
not coincide; the nation-state is not the universal form of polity. Connor's 
definition of nationalism is the identification with and loyalty to a group of pE;ople 
who believe that .they are ancestrally related. See Walker Connor, 
Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1994). pp. xi, 40 et passim. Eric Hobsbawm contends that 
nationalities are "imagined communities" "invented traditions" which are for the 
most part "conscious and deliberate" creations designed for ideological purposes, 
"exercises in social engineering" intended to create a continuity with the past that is 
largely factious. See Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of 
Tradition (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 2-3, 13, 263. 
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and romantic in spirit and of Western origin.28 It was from this second variety of 
nationalism that a particularly strong Russian nationalist sentiment emerged, the 
"patronizing attitude" of Panslavism. It was this version of Russian nationalism 
that was expansionistic in nature, and is still. 
A basic question arises from Kennan's approach, however. Is it correct to 
refer to Panslavism as the outward manifestation of Russian nationalism, or is it 
merely the outward manifestation of a Russian appetite for expansion? Adhering, 
for the moment, to a strict interpretation of Gellner's definition, Panslavism was 
not a form of Russian nationalism, because it sought far more than the formation of 
a Russian nation-state. But one must step beyond the simple definition and take 
into account Russian history. From 1533 to 1992 Russia had existed exclusively as an 
empire, and Panslavs sought to expand Russian control, or at a minimum to expand 
the Russian sphere of influence. Gellner describes nationalism as an act of self-
worship, and this is an accurate description of the Panslavic view of Russia as 
motherland and destined protector of all Slavic peoples. Kennan described the 
sentiment well: Panslavs possessed "an almost pathologic intensity of national 
feeling."29 
As the contemporary period of transformation within Russia continues and 
the process of foreign policy formation becomes institutionalized, the objectives of 
this policy will most likely mellow. But for the time it is well that analysts keep in 
mind the potential power behind Russian nationalism, particularly the "linguistic" 
strain of nationalism described by Kennan, which could provoke a resumption of 
Russian expansionist tendencies. As Kissinger has noted, Russian nationalism has 
historically been "missionary and imperial" in nature.30 
28Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order: Franco-Russian 
Relations, 1875-1890 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1979). 
29Ibid., p. 39. 
30Kissinger, p. 817. 
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(5) As the Russian and Soviet empires expanded, the multi-national character 
of these empires reinforced the need for strong, centralized, authoritarian rule. The 
new constitution ratified in the December 1993 national election provides for a very 
strong executive, along the same lines as the French system. Within this document 
there are provisions which allow the president to assume emergency powers, and 
Boris Yeltsin has already shown a propensity for strong, decisive action, provided he 
perceives that he has the support of the general public, and more importantly, the 
armed forces. 
The compelling force behind this need for a strong, highly centralized form of 
government remains essentially unchanged: while the territory controlled by the 
Russian Federation is greatly reduced when compared to the territory controlled by 
the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation nonetheless retains a strong multi-
national character. It is the perception of many within and without the Russian 
Federation that unless the central government retains sufficient power to maintain 
control over several wayward regions within the Federation, this new, democratic 
Russian Federation could go the way of the Soviet Union. 
Ironically, the current ethnic dilemma is largely a self-inflicted problem. 
While many of the national groups within the Russian Federation were for 
centuries the unwilling subjects of the Russian and Soviet central authorities, at 
times they were allowed to maintain (or in some cases develop) an ethnic identity 
and a national heritage distinct from the Russian and Soviet heritage. The Soviet 
policy of korenizatsiia, the "flourishing of nations," serves as the foremost example 
of this policy, and is the subject of an expansive work by Gerhard Simon.31 
Combined with the systematic movement of whole ethnic groups and occasional 
attempts at outright extermination, several of these ethnic groups have seriou~ 
grievances with past Russian and Soviet regimes. 
31Gerhard Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the 
Soviet Union: From Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society. Translated by 
Karen Forster and Oswald Forster. (Boulder, CO and Oxford: Westview Press, 1991). 
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These could be elements of a Russian strategic culture that influence 
contemporary Russian foreign policy. 
2. Hypotheses Drawn From Strategic Culture Theory 
Based on the definition of strategic culture and the tenets of tsarist and Soviet 
strategic culture discussed above, the following hypotheses can be derived: 
Hypothesis 1. States will have a preoccupation with security, demonstrating 
particular concern regarding loss of strategic depth, or the reduction of space 
between the frontiers and the heartland. 
Hypothesis 2 States will pursue expansion as a means of gaining or regaining 
secure borders. 
Hypothesis 3. States will appeal to nationalistic sentiment as a means of garnering 
public support for foreign policy objectives. 
Hypothesis 4. Foreign policy will be formulated at the highest levels; the real 
foreign policy decisions will be made by the national leader and a close circle of 
advisors. Executive branches ministries and departments will be relegated to a 
support function. 
B. REALPOLITIK AND THE BALANCE OF POWER 
1. Theory Discussion and Definition 
In the theory of political realism, politics and society in general are gov~med 
by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. It follows in this theory 
that there is a possibility of distinguishing between truth and opinion, "between 
what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by 
reason, and what is only subjective judgment, divorced from the facts as they are 
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informed by prejudice and wishful thinking."32 Within this assumption of 
objective truth, there is the implication that all states make decisions based on the 
same underlying principles: that this objective truth is universal, and that through 
the determination of these fundamental principles, one may deduce and thence 
understand the policies and the decisions that follow. As Hans J. Morgenthau states, 
"we assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power."33 
We also assume, therefore, that statesmen of all powers use the same rationale in 
their foreign policy calculus. Other factors, aside from these underlying principles, 
are irrelevant. 
At the outset, this seems a logical assumption and it is familiar ground in 
light of the previous discussion on the Soviet approach to nuclear strategy. As 
noted in this discussion, this is especially true when the internal factors of a state 
cannot be known, either because that state closely guards its foreign policy 
machinations, or because the state has undergone a dramatic institutional 
transformation, and the effects and extent of that change are not yet fully 
understood. The latter case applies in the case of the Russian Federation today. 
Notwithstanding the trappings of Soviet government, the December 1993 Russian 
constitution represents the Russian state's first attempt at democracy. 
There are analysts who point to the early years of this century as an example 
of an earlier Russian move toward democratization. That assertion, however, does 
not stand up under close scrutiny. The period in question is the immediate 
aftermath of the Revolution of 1905, when Nicholas II issued the October Manifesto, 
in which civil liberties were guaranteed, a Duma with real legislative functions was 
created, and further expansions of this new order were promised.34 This move split 
32Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Amon& Nations: The Stru&&le for Power and 
Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p. 4. 
33Ibid., p. 5. 
34Riasanovsky, pp. 407-408. 
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the opposition and quelled the fighting. Then, immediately prior to the convening 
of the first session of the Duma, the Tsar issued the first of the Fundamental Laws, 
which provided the framework for the new political system, "filling in the blanks" 
created by the October Manifesto. According to the Fundamental Laws the Tsar 
retained -- with the title of autocrat -- an incredible array of powers: complete control 
of the executive branch, the armed forces, foreign policy, succession to the throne, 
the imperial court, imperial domains, and the continued domination of the Russian 
Orthodox Church. And while the Duma received some legislative and budgetary 
rights, those rights were largely circumscribed.35 At first glance, the 1905 
government reforms appear to the start of a process of democratization in the 
Russian Empire. In retrospect, however, these reforms were in reality an imperial 
effort to placate the revolutionary opposition by placing them in a largely ineffective 
governmental process. 
Western analysts are still examining the 1993 constitution, and evaluating 
the Russian government in action. In the absence of knowledge concerning the 
process by which Russian foreign policy is formulated, Western observers may tend 
to assume that Russians follow the same single, universal strategic rationality that 
the West uses. As Graham Allison notes, "[t]he less the information about the 
internal affairs of a nation or government, the greater the tendency to rely on the 
classical model [the "Rational Actor Model"].36 
This is political realism: internal factors are essentially irrelevant, and are 
overwhelmed by the imperatives of the logic of Realpolitik. In this realm, the term 
Realpolitik, though not a new one, nonetheless has a variety of definitions 
associated with it. There does not seem to be one standard, accepted definition, and 
it is therefore important to review important key definitions, in order to dete~mine 
35Jbid., pp. 408-409. 
36Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1971), p. 24. 
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which one best applies to the current discussion. Students of Realpolitik generally 
focus on how the general constraints and incentives of the international system 
combine with the unique situations of individual states to lead them to foreign 
policies.37 Some consider Realpolitik to mean not "power politics" (see below 
discussion), but rather a state's ability to accept its existing limits and then to use 
them to the fullest extent in order to maximize its position in the international 
order.38 To others, Realpolitik is amoral and ahistorical, and according to this 
definition, the multiplicity of sovereign states acknowledge no political superior, 
and there is an element of anarchy in international relations. In this state of 
relations, therefore, power is anterior to society, law, and justice.39 The term "power 
politics" is a translation of the German Machtpolitik, which meant the conduct of 
international relations by force or the threat of force, without consideration of right 
and justice. This phrase, in turn, supplanted the older and more elegant term 
raison d'etat, which inferred that statesmen were not bound in public affairs by the 
morality they subscribe to in private life; there is a vague 'reason of state' which 
justifies unscrupulous action, if it is conducted in the public's interest. 40 
Martin Wight asserts that the most conspicuous theme in international 
history is the series of efforts, by one power after another, to gain mastery of the 
states-system. In a system of power politics the chief duty of each government to 
preserve the interests of the people it rules and represents against the competing 
interests of other peoples. There are, therefore, certain interests which are vital to 
37Posen, p. 35. 
38Robert C. Binkley, Realism and Nationalism: 1852-1871 (New York: Harper 
& Brothers Publishers, 1935), pp. 28-29. This book was one of the series entitled The 
Rise of Modern Europe, and edited by William L. Langer. 
39Martin Wight, in Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad, eds., Power Politics, 
(New York: Homes & Meier Publishers, Inc.,1978), pp. 221-222. 
40lbid., p. 29. 
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the continued existence of a given people. When powers agree to submit to 
arbitration or judicial process as a means of settling a dispute, they nearly always 
expressly exclude vital interests from the dispute settlement process.41 
Prestige is a principal focus of governments engaged in power politics.42 
Wight further contends that it is in the nature of powers to expand. The energies of 
their members radiate culturally, economically, and politically, and unless there are 
strong obstacles these tendencies will be summed up in territorial expansion. This 
expansion is the product of two causes: internal pressure and the weakness of 
surrounding powers. When equilibrium is reached between outward pressure and 
the external resistance, expansion stops. One of the basic kinds of expansion 
discussed by Wight is the quest for access to the sea, and according to Wight, Russian 
history has been interpreted as a territorial movement towards warm-water ports. 43 
Cyril E. Black similarly described a primary aim of Russian territorial expansion as " 
... the acquisition and maintenance of direct commercial outlets to the sea ... "44 
Black avoids any direct reference to warm water ports, but his point stands: Russian, 
the continental power, is constantly driving to gain direct access to sea-based trade 
routes. There has been, however, at least one recent attempt to disprove this notion 
of the Russian drive for warm-water ports. William C. Green asserts that "[t]he 
claim that Russians possess a historic drive for a warm water port must be rejected 
as a dangerous geopolitical myth."45 Green does provide a caveat in his thesis 
4llbid., pp. 30, 95. 
42Ibid., p. 99. 
43Ibid., pp. 144, 149. 
44Black, p. 14. 
45William C. Green, "The Historic Russian Drive for a Warm Water Port," 
Naval War College Review, Vol. XLVI, No.2 (Spring 1993), pp. 80-102. 
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which states that the absence of such a drive in Russia's past may not necessarily 
preclude future attempts by Russia to gain additional outlets to the sea. 
A corollary of the expansiveness of powers is their general refusal to suffer 
territorial loss without a struggle.46 
There are two exceptions to the rule of tenacity in a state's pursuit of 
territorial expansion: territorial exchange, and when a power had attained the 
capacity for being content with an economic or moral equivalent of dominion. 
Prudence will often make a power limit its liabilities, in accordance with its 
assessment of its special interests.47 There are also examples, however, of powers 
abandoning sovereignty over possessions, for motives in which calculation of 
interest may be mixed with considerations of justice. It is something that has been 
done by great powers at their zenith. 48 
Kenneth Waltz provides an excellent discussion of the concept of Realpolitik. 
He identifies the following elements of Realpolitik as the term applies to the 
modern nation-state: the state's interest provides the spring for action; the 
necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states; calculation 
based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a state's 
interests; success is ultimate test of policy, and success is defined as preserving and 
strengthening the state. Realpolitik indicates the methods by which foreign policy is 
conducted, and provides a rationale for them. And from this description there 
arises a theory that seeks to explain the results that such methods produce. Waltz 
calls balance of power a "distinctively political theory of international politics," but 
then notes that, as is the case with Realpolitik, that there is not a generally accepted 
46Wight, p. 151. 
47Jbid., pp. 152-153. 
48Ibid., p. 153. 
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statement which defines the term.49 This much can be said: balance of power theory 
assumes that states are unitary actors, and that these states pursue an objective from 
among various options that range from self-preservation, to relative power gain (as 
Waltz conceptualizes balance of power), to maximum power and universal 
domination. Furthermore, states rely on the rational means at their disposal to 
achieve their goals. These means can be either internal (focusing on economic 
development, military strength, or strategy) or external (alliance formation, 
maintenance, or in the case of an opposing alliance, alliance weakening or 
deterrence).SO 
Morgenthau identifies four different meanings for the term "balance of 
power: (1) a policy aimed at a certain state of affairs; (2) an actual state of affairs; (3) 
an approximately equal distribution of power; and, (4) any distribution of power.sl 
Wight describes two definitions of the term: it is both a system of foreign policy, as 
well as a historical law or theoretical principle of analysis in which spectators of 
international politics, including journalists, publicists and students, derive from or 
apply their observations.52 He then demonstrates that the term balance of power 
has several distinct meanings within international politics: 
1. An even distribution of power. 
2. The principle that power ought to be evenly distributed. 
49Kenneth N. Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and the Balance of Power, in Robert 0. 
Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University 
Press,1987), pp. 115-116. 
SOibid., p. 117. 
51Morgenthau, p. 167ff. 
52Wight, ''The Balance of Power," in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, 
eds., Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics 
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1966), p. 150. 
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3. The existing distribution of power. Hence, any possible distribution of power. 
4. The principle of equal aggrandizement of the Great Powers at the expense of the 
weak. 
5. The principle that "our" side ought to have a margin of strength in order to avert 
the danger of power becoming unevenly distributed. 
6. (When governed by the verb "to hold":) A special role in maintaining an even 
distribution of power. 
7. (Also when governed by the verb "to hold":) A special advantage in the existing 
distribution of power.53 
Balance of power as a principal characteristic of international relations is the 
oldest and perhaps best known paradigm. Its origins can be traced to Thucydides' 
History of the Peloponnisian War and an example of his description of the concept 
can be found in Sparta's decision to fight the Athenians because Sparta feared the 
"growing power" of Athens.54 David Hume, starting with the aforementioned 
Thuycidides, offers historical evidence that balance of power was "the prevailing 
notion of ancient times."55 In discussing the Grecian wars, Hume states the 
following: 
53Wight, "The Balance of Power," p. 151. 
54Donald Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnisian War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1969), p. 357. In an interesting argument, Laurie M. Bagby Johnson 
contends that Thuycidides is often incorrectly interpreted, and that neither realists 
or neorealists dr~w proper conclusions. In Johnson's opinion, Thuycidides was 
neither a realist nor a neorealist, and the "Thuycididean perspective" is best 
considered as an alternative or supplement to realism. See Johnson, ''The Use and 
Abuse of Thuycidides in International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 
48, No.2, Spring 1994, pp. 313-314. 
55David Hume, "Of the Balance of Power," Essays and Treatises on Various 
Subjects, 1770, p. 89. 
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... whether we can ascribe the shifting of sides in all the Grecian 
republics to jealous emulation or cautious politics, the effects were 
alike, and every prevailing power was sure to meet with a confederacy 
against it, and that often composed of its former friends and allies.56 
Of more recent vintage are essays on the balance of power written by ·wight, 
which provide perhaps the most lucid and compact discussion of this conception.57 
Hans J. Morgenthau demonstrates that balance of power is a universally understood 
and accepted concept, and it is commonly used in a variety of fields outside of 
international affairs, including physics, biology, economics, and sociology.ss 
According to Morgenthau, there are four methods of applying this balance of 
power concept in the conduct of foreign policy. These methods, if successful, would 
result in diminishing the power on one side of a balance of power, or increasing the 
power on the other side of the balance. These four methods are as follows: divide 
and rule, which means keeping competitors weak by dividing them or keeping 
them divided; compensation, in which territorial exchanges are used to maintain a 
balance; armament, which Morgenthau calls the principal means by which a nation 
endeavors to use its power to maintain or reestablish a balance; and finally, 
alliances, which have been historically the most important manifestation of the 
balance of power.59 
It is important to discuss, briefly, another important concept involving 
alliances: collective defense. The two terms are not the same. Balance of power 
56Ibid., p. 90. 
57See Wight, "The Balance of Power," previously cited; and Wight, "The 
Balance of Power and International Order," in Alain James, ed., The Bases of 
International Order: Essays in Honor of C. A. W. Manning (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1973, pp. 85-115. 
58Morgenthau, p. 168. 
59Ibid., pp. 178-181. 
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alliances are formed by individual states, or groups of individual states, on the basis 
of what each individual state regards as its national interests. Collective defense, on 
the other hand, is founded on a respect for a moral or legal obligation to regard an 
attack on any member of the alliance as an attack upon all members of the 
alliance.60 
For the purpose of this limited exercise, the following definition of balance of 
power, based primarily upon the works of Morgenthau and Wight, will be used: 
Balance of power is a foreign policy aimed at a certain state of 
affairs, namely that there will exist an equal aggrandizement among 
the various great powers of the world (with the assumption that Russia 
is such a power); and that Russia ought to have a margin of strength in 
order to avert the danger of another power gaining dominance over 
her. 
2. Hypotheses Drawn From Balance of Power Theory 
Based on this definition of balance of power, the following hypotheses 
concerning foreign policy behavior can be derived: 
Hypothesis 5. States will in principle focus on the establishment and maintenance 
of prestige, both at home and abroad. 
Hypothesis 6. In foreign policy, whenever geographically possible, state expansion 
will have as one goal the acquisition and protection of access to the sea. 
Hypothesis 7. States will resolutely refuse to suffer territorial loss without a 
struggle, unless there is an equitable exchange of territory (equitable from the 
national perspective) or the strong potential for the development of the economic 
or moral equivalence of territorial domination. 
60ibid., p. 193. 
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Hypothesis 8. Foreign policy will pursue one of the following methods in seeking to 
establish or maintain a "balance" in the international order: divide and rule, 
compensation, armament, alliance. 
C. OTHER THEORIES 
By examining the strategic culture of a particular state in an effort to 
understand the foreign policy decision-making process of that state, or by assuming 
that the state is using the precepts of Realpolitik/balance of power calculations in 
the formulation of foreign policy, this thesis adopts a unit-level perspective. Before 
proceeding with an analysis of the test cases according to this perspective, it is useful 
to consider the alternative perspectives: the systemic approach. According to Waltz, 
unit-level analyses that attempt to explain international outcomes through 
elements and combinations of elements located at the national or subnational levels 
amount to reductionism.61 Waltz summarily dismissed the utility of what he calls 
a "reductionist" approach in understanding the whole of world politics for years 
following his introduction of a neorealist approach, in which states are portrayed as 
functioning as undifferentiated units acting within a system. In Waltz's view, it is 
the character of the system as a whole that is critical to understanding international 
relations; history and culture are irrelevant.62 But it is difficult to use Waltz's 
approach as a model for developing theories for analyzing foreign policy; Waltz 
himself avoids any attempt at using structural realism as a foundation for predicting 
or analyzing foreign policy: 
A theory of international politics will ... explain why war 
occurs, and it will indicate some of the contradictions that make war 
61Waltz, "Reductionist and Systemic Theories," in Neorealism and Its Critics, 
previously cited, p. 47. 
62Johnston, p. 2. 
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more or less likely; but it will not predict the outbreak of particular 
wars. Within a system, a theory explains continuities. It tells one what 
to expect and why to expect it. Within a system, a theory explains 
recurrences and repetitions, not change.63 
To pursue the analysis of foreign policy using Waltz's structural realism 
would mean the use of the proverbial straw man; one would expend great effort to 
prop up and defend an approach that is easily defeated to begin with. 
There are other systemic models from which theories on foreign policy may 
be formulated. As one example, Robert Gilpin offers a cyclic system of hegemony 
and war. In this system, 
... the conclusion of one hegemonic war is the beginning of 
another cycle of growth, expansion, and eventual decline. The law of 
uneven growth continues to redistribute power, thus undermining the 
status quo established by the last hegemonic struggle. Disequilibrium 
replaces equilibrium, and the world moves toward a new round of 
hegemonic conflict. It has always been thus and always will be ... 64 
As in the case with Waltz, Gilpin concentrates on the character of the 
international system, not the elements within that system. While his cyclic 
approach to history is engaging, it cannot serve as a satisfactory explanation for the 
nature of foreign policy conducted by actors within that system. 
In contrast to these systemic approaches, there are other unit-level analyses 
aside from strategic culture and balance of power. For example, a number of 
scholars in recent years have embraced the study of domestic factors of nations as 
the significant variable in the calculus of foreign policy. In his popular analysis of 
American foreign policy formulation in the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison offers two 
developments along the lines of unit-level analysis. In his second and third · 
63Waltz, "Reductionist and Systemic Theories," p. 57. 
64Robert Gilpin, War & Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), p. 210. 
35 
conceptual lenses, Allison presents the paradigms of "organizational process" and 
"governmental (bureaucratic) politics." (His first lens is, of course, the rational actor 
model.) In the former, organizational process, the finished product of a decision-
making process is the output of an organization that functions in accordance with a 
regular and well-established pattern of behavior. In the latter, the end product 
results from bargaining that takes place between the various individuals and 
institutions within the government. Morton H. Halperin greatly expands this 
second concept with a detailed review of the nature of the American bureaucratic 
system in the post-World War II era, as that system approached issues involving 
national security.65 While being careful to avoid a wholesale denial of the validity 
of realism, Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein assert that domestic factors, 
including groups, social ideas, the character of constitutions, economic constraints, 
historical social tendencies, and domestic political pressures all play a role in the 
formation of a foreign policy ,66 
Miroslav Nincic examines the unique domestic influences over foreign 
policy that are associated with democracies and argues that, contrary to what is 
generally accepted, foreign policy can be conducted successfully on the basis of the 
application of domestic principles in the realm of foreign policy.67 In brief, Ninde's 
"Principled Pragmatism" form of foreign policy lists the following domestic 
elements necessary for the conduct of a successful foreign policy founded on 
domestic (by which Nincic means "democratic") principles: 
65Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington: 
The Brookings Institution, 1975). 
66Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand 
Strategies (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993). 
67Miroslav Nincic, Democracy and Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1992). 
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- a congressional or other elected voice that is heard on matters of general national 
import in foreign affairs 
- a public that is considered to be the repository of valid interests and opinions 
- governmental candor 
- the public and the legislative are accepted as legitimate participants in the 
determination of national objectives 
- foreign policy is closely tethered to the preferences of the national community.68 
The main virtues of such a relationship are that a country's foreign policy is 
closely aligned with national interest; there is a combination of ethical concerns, 
parochial concerns and commitment to national power and security, but no 
dominating class of concern; the resulting policy is neither particularly moralistic or 
ideological; such a system is conducive to pluralistic international order; this policy 
is tied to values at the heart of U. S. political culture -- human rights, liberties, free 
markets; and lastly, it is "anchored in a society's interests and beliefs, which rarely 
change in an abrupt and discontinuous manner, principles pragmatism should be 
more stable and coherent."69 
These alternative explanations may ultimately provide satisfactory 
foundations for analysis of the "new" Russian foreign policy. However, they each 
require a level of understanding of the institutions and mechanisms of the 
emerging democratic system of government in Moscow that is presently 
unavailable, or more simply unknown. The Russian government created by the 
December 1993 constitution has not yet developed the "regular and well-established 
patterns of behavior" predicted by Allison's organizational process. Analysis on the 
basis of Allison's governmental (bureaucratic) political process, or Halperin's 
bureaucratic model requires detailed knowledge of the individuals and institutions 
that comprise the foreign policy establishment within the Russian government. 
While the contemporary Russian government is far more transparent than its 
68Ibid., pp. 168-169. 
6 9Ibid., pp. 169-170. 
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Soviet predecessor, there is still much concerning the nature of the decision-making 
process and the individuals that comprise the system that is not understood. 
Elements of Rosecrance and Stein's study of the influence of domestic factors 
of foreign policy are contained in the concept of strategic culture, including the 
"social ideas" and the "historical social tendencies" elements. Nonetheless, an 
analysis of contemporary Russian foreign policy on the basis of Rosecrance and 
Stein would require more detailed information regarding the still-evolving post-
Soviet society from which the new political system is emerging. That system not yet 
stable, thereby making analysis of foreign policy decisions on its basis difficult, if not 
haphazard. 
A similar argument can be made regarding Ninde's approach, which assumes 
a firmly established, democratic form of government. Whether or not Russia is 
engaged in a true democratic transformation is still open to debate. Even if this 
development is genuine, it remains in its formative stages. One of the essential 
elements of a stable democracy is time -- its proven stability is a principle source of 
its legitimacy. And again, the processes and institutions established by the latest 
constitution are not yet fully realized: the Duma is still finding its voice and is not 
yet accepted as a legitimate participant in the determination of national objectives; 
the role of public opinion is still undetermined. 
Given the need for greater knowledge of the nature of Russian government, 
which in turn requires more time to allow the democratic process to continue, the 
best foundation for analysis of contemporary Russian foreign policy are strategic 
culture, which can be determined from history, and balance of power, which 
requires only an assumption of Russia as a rational actor seeking to maximize its 
position in the international order. 
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III. TEST CASE: THE "NEAR ABROAD" 
A. TEST CASE DISCUSSION 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union has created a new term in the lexicon of 
Russian foreign policy: the blizlznii rubezlze, or "near abroad."l Initially, the term 
developed somewhat ambiguously. Some used the phrase to describe former Soviet 
bloc countries of Eastern Europe; but there has developed a general acceptance of 
the definition of "near abroad" as all of the countries of the former Soviet Union, 
except Russia.2 A comprehensive study of the history of ethnic Russian migration 
into these regions is beyond the purview of this thesis. However, as an illustration 
of the impact of Russian expansion and domination on local nationals, consider the 
case of the Volga Tatars. Though the Tatars do not inhabit the "near abroad," 
Russian treatment of these descendants of Ghengis Khan -- and the people who 
maintained the ''Tatar yoke" over Muscovy for three centuries -- demonstrates the 
contempt with which Russians have traditionally held "lesser" nationalities. It also 
indicates the source of suspicion, bitterness and fear that colors the various 
nationalities of the former Soviet republics. 
Russian conquest was the most important event in Tatar history. In October 
of 1552 the armies of Ivan IV marched on Kazan. On the fifteenth of that month the 
city fell following a Russian siege. Kazan was the first non-Russian conquest for the 
newly-unified Russian state, and historians mark that conquest as the beginning of 
the Russian Empire -- an empire that would continue until 1991. After the 
conquest, Ivan pursued an expansive policy of colonization, with an aim of 
lBruce D. Porter and Carol R. Saivetz, ''The Once and Future Empire: Russia 
and the 'Near Abroad,"' The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1994, pp. 75-90. 
2In truth, the "near abroad" has never been defined in terms of a precise 
geographic area. The term is nonetheless widely accepted and used within the 
Russian Federation and without. See John Lough, "The Place of the Near Abroad in 
Russian Foreign Policy," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 11, 12 March 1993, pp. 
21-22££. 
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completely integrating the Tatars into his emerging empire.3 Tatars became second-
class citizens of Russia, were held responsible for obeying the law, and yet enjoyed 
none of the privileges associated with citizenship. 
After the conquest, the Russians immediately expelled all Muslims from 
Kazan.4 The tradition of religious tolerance observed by Russians and Tatars over 
the previous three centuries was shattered. In the second half of the fifteenth 
century, around 1498, the Russian Orthodox Church had acknowledged the Kazan 
ruler's mandate from heaven, but after the conquest the Church changed its tune 
completely. In the late sixteenth century Metropolitan Makarij compared Russians 
and Tatars in the following description of the basic characteristics of the two ethnic 
groups5: 
Russians Tatars 
believers nonbelievers 
religious godless 
Christians pagans 
pious impious 
pure unclean 
peaceful warlike 
good bad 
3Azade-ayse Rohrlich, The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilience 
(Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), p. 38. 
4Alexandre Benningsen, "The Muslims of European Russia and the 
Caucasus," in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., Russia and Asia (Stanford, CA: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1972), p. 138. 
5Jaroslaw Pelenski, Russia and Kazan: Conquest and Imperial Ideology (1438-
1560's) (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1974), pp. 302-303. 
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Land was confiscated and turned over to Russian landed gentry and various 
factions of the Russian Orthodox Church. A massive influx of peasants from 
European Russia, seeking to escape from the practice of serfdom, migrated to the 
Middle Volga and occupied the most fertile lands.6 A series of fortresses was 
constructed throughout the region, populated exclusively by Russians.7 Forced 
conversions to Christianity were sanctioned by the tsars, and force, propaganda, 
education and economic coercion were employed as incentives. Muslims were 
deported from any village with converts, and Muslim proselytism was banned on 
pain of death.B Russian assimilation efforts focused on the Tatar nobility and 
Muslim clergy, who were the leaders of resistance to the Russians. The end result of 
this long and intense attack on the leading elements of Tatar society was the decline 
of clergy and nobility influence. In their place a dynamic merchant and 
manufacturing class developed and became a leading force in Tatar society.9 
Conversion efforts achieved some success. In the sixteenth century a community of 
Christian Tatars, called Staro-Kriashens ("Old Converts," as distinguished from the 
Novo-Kriashens of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), emerged, though 
some converted merely to avoid persecution. By and large, however, the Russians 
failed to break the faith of Tatar Muslims, which was deeply rooted in the rural 
masses.lO 
In the typical imperial pattern, Russians dominated the cities and large towns, 
but could not penetrate Tatar rural society. While Russian peasants settled in close 
proximity to Tatar rural communities, making active resistance extremely difficult, 
6Benningsen, p. 138. 
71bid., p. 139. 
Blbid., p. 141. 
91bid. 
lOibid., P· 144. 
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Tatars clung to their cultural identity. Islam was especially strong in the 
countryside. Russian missionary policies waxed and waned in their intensity over 
the next four centuries.ll Though the activities and methods varied, the goal 
remained unchanged until the Revolution of 1917. That goal was the conversion 
of Tatars to Christianity, which in turn was a means of assimilating Tatar culture 
and integrating the Tatar nation.12 These policies of forced conversion were a 
source of Tatar bitterness toward their Russian overlords throughout the period of 
1552-1917. 
Throughout the Empire, ethnic Russians arrived on the crest of tsarist 
expansion, and following the Russian Revolution of 1917, the form but not the 
substance of empire and imperial control was altered.13 Only in December 1991 did 
the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. finally bring about this change in substance. 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of fifteen 
sovereign republics in the place of the monolithic Soviet state, twenty-five million 
ethnic Russians found themselves living beyond the borders of the Russian 
Federation.14 Of these twenty-five million, the vast majority were permanent 
llRohrlich defines six major shifts in Russian missionary policies during the 
period between 1552 and 1917. These periods were distinguished as follows: (1) The 
time of Archbishop Gurii, (2) the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries until the 
reign of Empress Anna Ivanova, (3) the period of the Kontora Novokriashenskikh 
Del, (4) the reign of Catherine II, (5) the nineteenth century policies of Il'minskii, 
and (6) the Il'minskii era. See Rohrlich, pp. 38 et passim. 
12Rohrlich, p. 38. 
13William D. Jackson, "Russia After the Crisis - Imperial Temptations: 
Ethnics Abroad," Orbis, vol38, No. 1, Winter 1994, p. 3. 
14Ibid., p. 1. This figure is based on 1989 Soviet census, and is the most 
common number associated with the Russian population in the "near abroad." 
Figures do range as high as thirty million, however. See also Daniel S. Papp, "The 
Former Soviet Republics and the Commonwealth of Independent States," in 
Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, eds., The Defense of Nations: A Comparative 
Study (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 208. 
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residents of the then titular republics at the time the union fell apart. Over fifty 
percent had been born in non-Russian union republics; many had married titular 
nationals.15 This vast population, the product of centuries of imperial expansion 
and domination, were frequently disliked for exactly this reason: they were the 
symbol and ever-present reminder of centuries of domination, first under the tsars, 
then under the Bolsheviks. This vast Russian diaspora has prompted anxious 
speculation within Russia regarding their fate in the new political order. Russian 
officials took up this cause and, in the name of human rights, proclaimed that the 
treatment of these ethnic Russians is a vital national interest of the Russia 
Federation. Moreover, beginning in 1993 Yeltsin and other Russian officials 
increasingly emphasized that Russia would act to protect Russians living outside 
the Federation, using military force, if necessary.16 At that time the military 
establishment clearly wanted the option of stationing troops in the territory of the 
"near abroad" .1 7 The first draft of Russia's new military doctrine, published in May 
1992, continued to place Moscow at the center of a unified Commonwealth of 
Independent States defense space, named the defense of Russians in the "near 
abroad" as a legitimate casus belli, and suggested that Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet republics remained a part of Russia's sphere of influence.18 Additionally, 
there was included in this draft a list of existing and potential sources of military 
danger for Russia. Several of the items on this list could be directly applied to the 
"near abroad": existing and potential local wars and armed conflicts, particularly 
those in the immediate vicinity of the Russian borders; the suppression of rights, 
15Jackson, p. 2. 
16Papp, p. 208. 
17Stephen Sestanovich, "Russia Turns The Corner," Foreign Affairs, 
January/February 1994, p. 96. 
18Stephen Foye, "Updating Russian Civil-Military Affairs," RFE/RL Research 
Report, Vol. 2, No. 46, 19 November 1993, p. 46. 
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freedoms, and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign 
states; the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of interests of 
the Russian Federation's military security (which is later expanded to specify the 
introduction of foreign troops in the territory of neighboring states of the Russian 
Federation).19 
The final draft of the Russian defense doctrine was approved by the Russian 
Federation Security Council on 2 November 1993; this time the text was not 
published. However, on the day after the doctrine was approved, Defense Minister 
Pavel Grachev held a press conference in which the main tenets of the new policy 
were openly discussed;20 The document itself remains classified.21 
Most press attention centered on the renunciation of the Soviet "first use" 
clause regarding the employment of nuclear weapons. However, there were items 
of considerable significance to Russia's "near abroad" policy: 
"Russia's new military doctrine envisions [a new] mission--
conducting peacekeeping operations. Such operations can be carried 
out with the C.I.S. and, by decision of the U.N. Security Council and 
other international bodies outside the Commonwealth ... , provided 
they are not in conflict with Russia's interests and Russian law."22 
19The first reported draft of the new Russian military doctrine appeared in 
Voennaya mysl (a special issue), in May 1992. Rossiyskiye Vesti, 18 November 1993, 
p. 1-2, as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter, FBIS). See 
also the discussion in Scott McMichael, "Russia's New Military Doctrine," RFE/RL 
Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 49, 9 October 1992, pp. 45-50. 
20Foye, pp. 47-48. 
21Pavel Felgengauer, "Ministry of Defense is Winning a Sub-Rosa Contest," 
Sevodnya, 9 October 1994, p. 1, as reported in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet 
Press, Vol. XIV, No. 41,1993, p. 27. 
22 "'Basic Provisions' of Military Doctrine Adopted," The Current Digest of 
the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLV, No. 44, 1993, pp. 11, which included portions of two 
items from Izvestia, 4 November 1993. 
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And, a second item: 
"Russia does not rule out the possibility of maintaining Russian 
troops, bases and installations on the territory of other countries -- on 
the basis ... of bilateral and multilateral agreements with the countries 
in which they would be located."23 
In April1994 Boris Yeltsin allegedly signed a presidential directive that made 
a nearly-identical statement. It was supposedly an endorsement of a Russian 
Defense Ministry proposal to establish military bases in C.I.S. states and in Latvia 
(not a C.I.S. member-state) for the purpose of maintaining Russian security.24 The 
Russian government first denied, then retracted the directive on the following day, 
and issued an apology to the Latvian government. 
In Article 61 of the new Constitution of the Russian Federation, which was 
approved in the 12 December 1993 election, there is the stipulation that the Russian 
Federation guarantees protection to Russian citizens who live beyond the borders of 
the Russian Federation.25 Under this constitution, the requirements for Russian 
citizenship are defined separately, under federal law. That Russia has included the 
25 million expatriate Russians in its definition of citizens is to many an ominous 
sign of Russian attempts to regain influence in the "near abroad" .. 26 
231bid. 
24RFE/RL Daily Report, 7 April1994. The complete text of the alleged 
document was printed in Rossiiskiye vesti, 7 April1994, p. 7 under the title, 
"Directive of the President of the Russian Federation." See The Current Digest of 
the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLVI, No. 14, 1994, p. 1. 
25 "The Text of the Draft Constitution," The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet 
Press, XLV, No. 45, 8 December 1993, pp. 4-16. 
26Mikhail S. Tsypkin, Trip Report [regarding 6-19 April1994 visit to Moscow, 
Russia], April1994, p. 6. 
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Some of the newly independent republics have aggravated the situation by 
adopting laws that discriminate (at least in the Russian view) against ethnic 
Russians, who often constitute a sizable minority of the republic's population. Of 
course, these republics justify nationalistic legislation as a necessary step in 
correcting the injustices perpetrated by seventy years of Soviet (read: Russian) rule. 
Their indigenous nationalities must be preserved and strengthened after enduring 
generations of Russification. Consider the case of Russian-Estonian relations, as an 
example of the complexity of this issue. 
When Estonia declared its independence from the Soviet Union on 21 
August 1991, there were between 20,000 and 25,000 Soviet Army troops on Estonian 
territory. To the Russians' credit, when it became clear that the Soviet Union was 
crumbling and that Estonia had no intention of joining the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, they implemented a plan for the complete withdrawal of all 
military forces from Estonia, without a written, negotiated agreement. The 
Russians promised to complete the withdrawal before 31 August 1994. In return for 
this apparent "gentleman's agreement," Estonia would take control of all military 
installations but would not press for any compensation due to ecological damage. 
Furthermore, Estonia agreed to allocate 23 [m]illion (U.S.) dollars for housing 
facilities for the Russian troops that were being withdrawn from the republic.27 
This final concession of the part of Estonia highlighted a serious problem 
facing the Russians, which would obviously affect any timetable for withdrawal: 
what could be done with the hundreds of thousands of troops returning from 
Central Europe and the former Soviet republics. Despite this obstacle, the 
withdrawal began and as of 5 April1994; there were only 2,500 officers and men 
awaiting return to the Russian Federation. At this point, negotiations betwee:r:t 
Estonia and Russia designed to solidify these agreements bogged down, created 
27foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (hereafter, FBIS), 5 
April1994. 
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tension in the bilateral relations and jeopardized the withdrawal of forces by the 
August deadline. 
At the heart of this disagreement was the fate of 11,000 Russian military 
pensioners and their families -- a total of 44,000 people. In its Foreigners Act, 
Estonia had imposed stringent citizenship requirements, and Russia wanted 
assurances that the pensioners will receive permanent residence permits and 
guaranteed social benefits, and they wanted these provisions included as part of the 
troop withdrawal agreement. Russia was using a similar agreement negotiated with 
Latvia as precedence, but Estonia flatly refused to follow the Latvian model.28 
Estonia refused to link the two issues, and would negotiate a resolution of the 
pensioner conflict as a separate matter only after a written withdrawal agreement 
was signed.29 The two sides even disagreed over the demographics of the pensioner 
group. Estonia maintained that a larger number of the retired personnel are quite 
young and had served in the K.G.B. or special forces, thereby considering them to be 
an unacceptable internal security threat. Russia countered with statistics that show 
that only 1,600 of the 11,000 pensioners are under fifty years of age.30 
Bilateral negotiations deteriorated to the point that on 6 April 1994, Russian 
negotiators withdrew the article of the draft document which guaranteed removal 
of all Russian troops by 31 August. According to Russia's chief negotiator, the 31 
August deadline was "no longer actual."31 Estonia began pleading its case in every 
28Estonian Foreign Minister Juri Luik stated the Estonian position succinctly: 
"Estonia is not obliged to follow the Latvian example in the issue of retired Russian 
servicemen. Estonia has no intention of engaging in any compromise in the issue 
of granting social protection to Russian military pensioners residing in the 
republic." FBIS, 31 March 1994. 
29FBIS, 8 April1994. 
30FBIS, 6 April1994. 
31FBIS, 6 April1994. 
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available venue in the international arena. The Estonian foreign ministry 
reiterated statements of support for Russian withdrawal that had been made by 
NATO, the European Union, the Conference for Secuity and Cooperation in Europe 
(C.S.C.E.), the Nordic prime ministers, and the United States.32 Estonia secured the 
support of the Baltic Assembly.33 
On 7 April1994, one day after the breakdown of negotiations, members of the 
114th Motorized Rifle Division of the Russian Army stationed in Tallinn, the 
capital of Estonia, conducted a live fire exercise at a Russian practice range on the 
outskirts of the city without seeking permission from Estonian authorities, and 
without inviting Estonian officials to observe the exercise.34 The timing could 
hardly be called coincidental, and if the Estonians had missed the point at the 
negotiations table, they surely understood this heavy-handed reminder of the 
important difference between political power and military power: the troops would 
stay until Russia was satisfied with the agreement. An agreement was reached and 
the Russian Army completed its withdrawal prior to 31 September. 
The aforementioned military pensioners represent part of a much larger 
security dilemma for Estonia: the presence of a significant Russian minority among 
the population. Of a total population of 1,583,000 people in Estonia, only 61 percent 
are ethnic Estonians. A full 30 percent of the residents are Russian, while another 
three percent are Ukrainian. And the concern that Russia demonstrates for its 
pensioners is reflective of its overall concern for all ethnic Russians living outside 
32FBIS, 6 April1994 and 15 April1994. 
33RFE/RL Daily Report, 16 May 1994. 
34FBIS, 13 April1994. 
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the boundaries of the Russian Federation. These areas figure prominently in the 
increasingly aggressive scheme of Russian national interests.35 
At the heart of the matter in Estonia is the establishment of strict 
requirements for determining citizenship, including mandatory language 
proficiency, under the auspices of the Foreigners Act passed by the Estonian 
parliament in 1993.36 Sergei Stankevich, policy advisor to President Boris Yeltsin, 
has characterized Estonian policy as an attempt to create a "mono-ethnic state/' and 
declared that the Foreigners Act creates socially intolerable conditions for the 
Russian-speaking population, and simultaneously all the essential conditions for 
mass deportation.37 While Stankevich may have engaged in some hyperbole, as a 
result of the Act almost half a million Russians living in Estonia have yet to be 
granted Estonian citizenship.38 Russian language higher education is no longer 
offered in the country39; the application process for receiving a permanent 
residence permit is complicated, and includes compulsory AIDS and psychiatric 
tests; Russians claim they face dismissal from jobs, loss of property, and direct 
deportation sorely on the basis of ethnicity.40 
35For an analysis of this trend, see John Lough, "The Place of the 'Near 
Abroad' in Russian Foreign Policy/' RFE/RL Research Report, 12 March 1993, pp. 21-
29. 
36For an in-depth look at the legislation, see Ann Sheehy, ''The Estonian Law 
on Aliens/' RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 38, 28 September 1993, pp. 7-11. 
37Vladimir Prokhavatilov, "How Are We To Reconstitute the Near Abroad?" 
Novaya Yezhednevnaya Gazeta, No. 14, 7 July 1994, p. 2, as reported in FBIS, 29 July 
1994. 
38FBIS, 9 February 1994. 
39FBIS, 9 March 1994. 
40RFE/RL Daily Report, 15 April1994. 
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As an indication of the degree of restlessness among the Russian minority in 
Estonia, over half of them ( some 300,000 people) voted for ultra-nationalist 
Vladimir Zhirinovskiy in the 12 December Russian parliamentary election. 41 
Russia passed a law on 6 February 1992 in which Russian citizenship was offered to 
all former Soviet citizens who had not yet declared an intent to seek citizenship 
from another state.42 Consequently, polling stations were established in Estonia to 
allow Russian citizens living there to vote in the December 1993 elections. As an 
aside, since the elections there have been charges of election fraud. According to 
Russian press reports, "gross mistakes or deliberate falsification of election results 
took place in Estonia, and a number of other places." 43 
In Estonia, the Russian minority issue and a border dispute with Russia have 
merged in the northeastern town of Narva, where Russians enjoy a sizable local 
majority. In 1991, after the Estonian declaration of independence, the local Russian-
controlled government opted to follow Soviet laws instead of Estonian laws. When 
the Estonian government dissolved the government and staged new elections, the 
same delegates were chosen. This time the local government held a referendum in 
which 96 percent of the voters supported territorial autonomy. The Russian 
government appears willing to use this restive Russian population as a trump card 
in bilateral negotiations. Stankevich implied that, if Estonia does not ensure that 
the Russian minority is afforded the full protection of their rights under the law, the 
Russian Federation would support attempts of the local Russian minority in Estonia 
to establish "territorial autonomy." 44 
41FBIS, 9 March 1994. 
42Martin Klatt, "Russians in the 'Near Abroad,"' RFE/RL Research Report, 
Vol. 3, No. 32, 19 August 1994, p. 33. 
43Vera Tolz and Julia Wishnevsky, "Election Queries Make Russians Doubt 
Democratic Process," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 13, 1 April1994, p. 2. 
44FBIS, 26 July 1994. 
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Heavy-handed Russian foreign policy toward Estonia is indicative of Russia's 
increased involvement in many of the former Soviet republics. Russia has sought 
the approval of the United Nations and the C.S.C.E. for the designation of the "near 
abroad" as an area of Russian special interests, and with that endorsement the 
assurance that Russia would be granted exclusive rights to engage in any 
peacekeeping operations in the region. Aside from an obvious play for financial 
support from the United Nations, many see this as an attempt to reassert control 
over area lost in the collapse of the Soviet Union. In fact, even without U. N. 
approval, since mid-1992 about 15,000 Russian troops have been engaged in 
peacekeeping operations in the "near abroad".45 Among the more notable areas of 
operations are the following regions. First, the Transdniester region in Moldova, in 
which the Russian 14th Army, under the command of Lt-General Alexander Lebed, 
was tasked in July 1992 to restore order to the left bank of the Dniestr River. Lebed 
has declared that the end result of his operations should be the incorporation of the 
self-proclaimed Transdniester Republic into the Russian Federation.46 Second, 
operations in the separatist Abkhazia region of Georgia, in which Russia 
successfully bartered for Georgian consent for the deployment of Russian forces to 
enforce a peacekeeping force.47 These negotiations completed Eduard 
Schevardnadze' s and Georgia's return to the Russian sphere of influence; 
Schevardnadze is now completely dependent on Russian forces for the maintenance 
of Georgian security. Third, Russian peacekeeping observers are deployed along the 
front of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over the Armenian enclave of Nagornyy-
Karabakh. Russian attempts to bring both parties to the negotiating table have thus 
45MAJ Mark T. Davis, USA, "Russian 'Peacekeeping Operations:' An Issue of 
National Security?" unpublished ms., 3 September 1993, p. 3. 
46Ibid., p. 4. 
47Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
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far failed.48 There are indications, however, that Russia is supplying both sides in 
the conflict. If true, this might be an attempt to force one or both sides into 
dependence on Russia for their security, much in the way Georgian submission has 
been gained. In Tadjikistan, since the March 1993 declaration that a Commonwealth 
of Independent States peacekeeping operation had failed, operations have been 
undertaken almost exclusively by the Russian Army, and have included armed 
raids of rebel positions across the Afghan border.49 
There are issues related to the "near abroad" within Russian borders. For 
instance, there is growing concern over the immigration trends. In 1992, over 
356,000 Russians returned from the "near abroad", with the greatest influx 
originating from Tadjikistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova.so 
In November 1993, Foreign Minister Kozyrev stated that "the day of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine had passed." The Brezhnev Doctrine grew from the Soviet 
response to the 1968 "Prague Spring," which was first established in a Pravda article, 
dated 26 September 1968. The key passage stated the following: 
There is no doubt that the peoples of the socialist countries and 
the Communist Parties have and must have freedom to determine 
their country's path to development. However, any decision of theirs 
must damage neither socialism in their country not the worldwide 
workers' movement, which is waging a struggle for socialism. This 
means that every Communist Party is responsible not only for its own 
people but also to all the socialist countries and to the entire 
Communist movement. Whoever forgets this in placing sole 
48Ibid., p. 5. 
49Ibid., p. 6. 
so "Migration Status in Russia, CIS: 2-4 Million Could Return to the Russian 
Federation by the Year 2000," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 13 July 1994, p. 2, as reported in 
FBIS, 13 July 1994. 
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emphasis on the autonomy and independence of Communist Parties 
lapses into one-sidedness, shirking his internationalist obligations.51 
Essentially, the Brezhnev Doctrine stated that no socialist country may leave 
the Warsaw Pact, that the Communist Party must maintain a monopoly of power, 
and that no party can have a leadership that is completely independent of 
Moscow.52 
Despite Kozyrev' s proclamation of the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine, Russia's 
foreign policy has grown steadily more assertive. Two months after his statement, 
Kozyrev asserted that the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from other former 
Soviet republics was an extremist idea.53 As long ago as December 1992 the foreign 
minister was hinting that the use of military force for the protection of Russians in 
the "near abroad" would not be ruled out. In an article discussing the role and 
direction of Russian foreign policy, Kozyrev identified one of the principal tasks as 
creating "a zone of goodneighborliness along Russia's periphery," which connoted 
"establishing equal yet special relations with the ex-Soviet republics" and yet in the 
following paragraph he listed the defense of the rights, lives and dignity of the 
Russian citizens in the "near abroad" as a critical issue and indicated that Russia 
51S. Kovalev, "Sovereignty and the Internationalist Obligations of Socialist 
Countries," Pravda, 26 September 1968, p. 4, as reported in the The Current Digest of 
the Soviet Press, Vol. XX, No. 39, October 1968, p. 10. 
52Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since 
World War II (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), p. 227. 
53 "Enter Yet Another Yeltsin," The Economist, 22 January 1994, p. 51. It must 
be acknowledged that not all former Soviet republics want the Russian Army to 
withdraw from their territory. Perhaps the most unsettling part of Kozyrev's 
statement was its vagueness; he did not specifically mention any of the former 
territories, and thereby made it all-inclusive. 
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"may have to use economic and military power" to achieve this.54 In February 1993 
Yevgeny Ambartsumov, then Chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet 
Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations made this 
same point even more forcefully: "We cannot rule out the possibility of using 
forcible methods to solve such [human rights] problems, including the problem of 
protecting the lives of our compatriots as well as other people who now die [in the 
'near abroad']." That same month Kozyrev stated the need to establish a belt of 
goodneighborliness because "we need first-class relations inside the C.I.S. if Russia is 
to become a first-class power. I reject the notion of a 'post-imperial' area. Nor can I 
accept attempts to limit cooperation among C.I.S. countries." 55 In an article 
published in the summer of 1992 and fraught with references to Russia's historical 
destiny, Stankevich identifies Russia's "mission in the world" as follows: "Russia 
the conciliator, Russia connecting, Russia combining."56 He ends the article by 
stating his belief that Russia is in a position "to obtain propitious geopolitical 
positions in key regions, and to rank, in time, among the world leaders." 57 A year 
later, in January 1993, the Acamedian Konstantin Pleshakov followed the 
Stankevich' s theme with an article in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
journal International Affairs entitled, "Russia's Mission: The Third Epoch." In this 
article, Pleshakov asserts that it has been Russia's mission in the past to save Europe 
by serving as a giant buffer, first against the Mongol invasion, then against 
Napoleon, and finally against Hitler. Russia also served as the means of uniting 
54Andrei V. Kozyrev, "To the Readers," International Affairs [Moscow], 
December 1992, pp. 3-4. 
55Kozyrev, "What Foreign Policy Should Russia Pursue?" International 
Affairs [Moscow], February 1993, p. 4. 
56Sergei Stankevich, "Russia in Search of Itself," The National Interest, 
Summer 1992, p. 47. 
57Jbid., p. 51. 
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Eastern and Western civilization. Pleshakov maintains that Russia's mission today 
is to serve as a basic component for Eurasian stability: "Russia remains the mainstay 
of stability and a great Eurasian power." 58 
This entire discussion fails to adequately explain the general Russian lack of 
resistance to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the corresponding pursuit of 
independence on the part of all fourteen other Soviet constituent republics back in 
1991-92. Why didn't Russia move to prevent the breakup of the Soviet Union more 
decisively? To understand this apparent disregard for the loss of empire, one must 
understand the fundamental nature of the events of 1991, when Soviet central 
authority eroded and crumbled in the wake of the unsuccessful August coup. The 
plotters effort failed miserably and Boris Yeltsin and his supporters were able to turn 
the situation into a genuine revolution which resulted in the end of communism 
in both the periphery, Eastern European, and the center, the Soviet Union.59 But in 
so doing they were confronted with the "problem of dismantling,"60 as Martin 
Malia called it. Post-Soviet political and constitutional order had to be completely 
re-invented. No where was that need more evident than in the Russian 
Federation, where the end of communism had a more profound impact than in the 
other former Soviet republics. The communist regime had attempted to link 
Russian national identity and interests with Soviet identity and interests, to a 
greater degree than in any other republic. That linkage was reenforced at the 
structural level: unlike the other republics, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist 
Republic had not been given some of the institutions, the trappings of state, granted 
to all other republics: no Russian K.G.B., no Russian M.V.D., no Russian Academy 
58Konstantin Pleshakov, "Russia's Mission: The Third Epoch," International 
Affairs [Moscow], January 1993, pp. 17-26. 
59Martin Malia, "From Under the Rubble, What?" Problems of Communism, 
Jan-Apr 1992, p. 90. 
60Z [Martin Malia], "To the Stalin Mausoleum," Daedalus,Winter 1990, p. 337. 
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of Sciences, no television or radio programming geared toward ethnic Russian 
interests, and -- incredibly -- no Russian Communist Party.61 Russians were 
grappling with the collapse of their only identifiable state structures; they were in no 
position to deal with the loss of the Baltics, Ukraine, Belarus or any of the other 
republics. 
Moreover, the dissolution of all ties between Russia and the other fourteen 
republics was necessary in order to eliminate any connection between Russian 
traditional interests in these areas and the decades of Soviet domination. The 
Russians had to disentangle themselves from the party organization, and distance 
themselves from the domination that the party held over the other republics. 
Again, Malia: "[T]he revolts of national liberation, beginning with Lithuania and 
culmination with Russia itself, were essential to destroying the hold of the party 
over all its subjects."62 Any attempt on the part of Russia to claim a legitimate right 
to domination over the other former Soviet republics would have tainted their 
claim at the outset. 
Neither of these points refute the notion that Russia harbored an interest in 
perpetuating control over these territories in 1991-92, when the Soviet Union 
crumbled. Rather, they indicate that Russian preoccupation with the political 
vacuum created by the end of communism and the collapse of the Soviet center, 
coupled with the need to distance Russia from the Soviet legacy, presented an 
opportunity for the other former Soviet republics to "make a break" for 
independence and left Russia to pursue lost territories rather than retain territories 
still under their control. Willingness to tolerate the loss of significant territories of 
the U.S.S.R. could be viewed as an effort to shore up Russian national power by 
divesting the state of peripheral assets that served as a drain on scarce resources. 
61John Dunlop, "Russia" Confronting a Loss of Empire," in Ian Bremmer and 
Ray Taras, eds., Nations & Politics in the Soviet Successor States (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 43. 
62Malia, "From Under the Rubble, What?" p. 92. 
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B. HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
1. Strategic Culture 
Hypothesis 1. States will have a preoccupation with security, demonstrating 
particular concern regarding loss of strategic depth, or the reduction of space 
between the frontiers and the heartland. 
This hypothesis appears to be upheld. In the immediate aftermath of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union the Russian Federation, despite its self-proclaimed 
designation as the successor state of the Soviet Union, essentially "gave up" the 
other former Soviet republics and allowed them to pursue independence. Strategic 
culture cannot explain this retreat from empire; it seems that the only plausible 
explanation is that the decision by Russia not to resist the independence 
movements of the other fifteen republics was a difficult choice made by necessity 
and not preference. However, since mid- to late-1992 Russia has demonstrated 
considerable concern for stability on its frontiers. It has also demonstrated a strong 
desire to prevent the deployment of forces from the West, particularly from well-
organized alliances such as NATO, to the "near abroad". Regardless of statements 
that acknowledge the sovereignty of the states in the "near abroad", Russian 
military doctrine identifies the area of operations of the Russian armed forces to be 
the entire region of the former Soviet Union. Though they have lost political 
ground, they refuse to surrender strategic ground. 
Hypothesis 2. States will pursue expansion as a means of gaining or regaining 
secure borders. 
This hypothesis is upheld. This hypothesis would not hold true if the 
definition of expansion were limited to territorial aggrandizement in the traditional 
sense of placing land directly under Moscow's sovereignty, as opposed to Moscow's 
control and/ or influence. To date, the Russian Federation has not engaged in direct 
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military operations, foreign policy, or political maneuvering to reincorporate areas 
of the former Soviet Union into its territory. 
However, Moscow has been able to expand its control over events in the 
"near abroad" by pursuing a policy aimed at gaining influence instead of direct 
sovereignty. Some have seen the effort to strengthen the institutions of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States as a thinly veiled attempt to reintroduce 
Russian hegemony. Konstantin Pleshakov sees the primary means of stabilizing 
the Eurasian geopolitical situation is by consolidating and strengthening the C.I.S.63 
Others point to Yeltsin' s proclamation earlier this year that Russia will seek to 
deploy its armed forces to bases in the C.I.S. states and Latvia as an indication of 
Russian expansionist designs. There is also the matter of Russian peacekeeping 
operations throughout the "near abroad". Proponents of the view that these 
peacekeeping forces are a means of forcing the reintegration of former Soviet 
republics into a new Russian-dominated empire point to the actions of the 
aforementioned Lt-Gen. Lebed of the 14th Army in Moldova. 
Lebed' s goals and interests appear to extend well beyond the successful 
completion of his assigned tasks. Lebed correctly perceived that in the immediate 
aftermath of the Soviet collapse, while the political leadership was engaged in the 
project of building liberal institutions, the Russian center was weak, poorly 
controlled, and in no position to formulate substantive foreign policy. This lack of 
policy determination processes at the center left enterprising on-scene commanders 
such as Lebed with a great deal of autonomy and power. They were free to 
formulate and execute a de facto Russian foreign policy that best suited their 
professional missions and personal interests. Lebed's 14th Army has functioned 
essentially as the armed forces of the separatist Dniester Republic, in operations 
against Moldovan forces, and in so doing Lebed has gained considerable power and 
influence. In August 1994 Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev attempted to 
remove Lebed from his command and transfer him to the post of Defense Minister 
63Pleshakov. 
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of Tadjikistan (Note the level of influence in Central Asia; a Russian Army general 
serving as defense minister of an independent, "sovereign" Tadjikistan.) Grachev 
also ordered the reduction of forces assigned to the 14th Army.64 A clear indication 
of Lebed's power is that President Yeltsin rescinded Grachev's orders and a 
subsequent "campaign" by the government to praise Lebed and his achievements in 
Moldova, despite Lebed's searing criticism of Yeltsin.65 
Clearly Moscow has demonstrated a keen interest in influencing, if not 
outright controlling, events in key areas of the "near abroad". Alternately, at a 
minimum Moscow has tolerated without reproach the efforts of Russian forces to 
achieve the same ends. 
Hypothesis 3. States will appeal to nationalistic sentiment as a means of garnering 
public support for foreign policy objectives. 
This hypothesis is upheld. Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev is a master of 
political maneuver, and has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to shift deftly 
between pro-Western statements and a more nationalistic tone, depending on his 
audience. Upon the fall of the Soviet Union, Kozyrev quickly proclaimed a 
staunchly pro-W estern policy, but then he at time he appeared to acquiesce in the 
face of heavy criticism from the old Supreme Soviet, a highly conservative body, 
shifting the emphasis of his policy statements to more conservative lines of 
thought.66 
Kozyrev's December 14, 1992, speech to a meeting of the C.S.C.E. in 
Stockholm, Sweden stands as a prime example of his ability to shift positions. 
Kozyrev began his speech by announcing a shift in Russian foreign policy, and then 
64RFE/RL Daily Report, 29 August 1994. 
65RFE/RL Daily Reports, 30 and 31 August 1994. 
66FBIS, 16 February 1993, pp. 33-38. 
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he warned against Western intervention in the successor states of the Soviet Union 
(i.e. the "near abroad"), and further declared that Moscow might use military force 
and economic pressure to reassert control over the former Soviet republics. With 
respect to the Balkan conflict, Kozyrev proclaimed Slavic solidarity with Serbia and 
demanded an end to sanctions against that nation. He promised that the Serbs 
would have the full support of "Great Russia." The speech was vintage Cold War 
material.67 
The conference was stunned. Delegations conferred frantically; the 
Ukrainian foreign minister went so far as to phone his government in Kiev to 
determine whether hard-liners in Moscow had staged a successful coup. After thirty 
minutes, Kozyrev returned to the podium and declared that his entire speech was a 
ruse, intended to illustrate the position held by political opponents to President 
Boris N. Yeltsin, and the dangers to European security that these opponents 
represent.~8 
Studied alone, Kozyrev's "Shockholm" speech was little more than a blatant 
attempt at shock diplomacy. But considering the events that immediately followed 
his address in Stockholm, the speech took on added significance. On 15 December, 
the day after Kozyrev's speech, Viktor Chernomyrdin, at the time perceived to be a 
political conservative, succeeded committed reformer Yegor Gaidar as Prime 
Minister of the Russian Federation. Then, on 16 December, the Security Council 
assumed responsibility for formulating Russian foreign policy, a move that isolated 
Kozyrev and, given the swing of the Prime Minister's chair in the Council of 
Ministers, gave conservatives considerably more power in implementing their 
foreign policy agenda. Kozyrev' s speech was a thinly veiled warning of the 
67fhe full content of Kozyrev's brief but pointed remarks are in Suzanne 
Crow, "Why Has Russian Foreign Policy Changed?" RFE I RL Research Report, Vol. 
3, No. 18,6 May 1994, pp. 1-6. 
68Craig R. Whitney, "Russian Carries On Like Bad Old Days, Then Says It Was 
All a Ruse," New York Times, 15 December 1992, p. A-4. 
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consequences of the shift in government power in Moscow, and demonstrated a 
deep rift within the government. 
As recently as 11 November 1993, Andrei Kozyrev was pronouncing the 
death of the Brezhnev doctrine. And yet, just two months later in January 1994 he 
seemingly developed a new appreciation for the application of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine. TASS quoted him as saying that a complete withdrawal of Russian troops 
from other former Soviet republics was an "extremist idea." Since late 1993, 
Kozyrev has advocated every concept contained in his Stockholm speech. Russia 
has denounced talk of bringing the Baltic states into NATO, restated Russia's claims 
to "special rights" and to a special peacekeeping responsibility in the states of the 
former Soviet Union, and called for the lifting of international sanctions against 
Serbia. Kozyrev now espouses the need to consider "historic ties" in the area of the 
former Soviet Union that was achieved over the centuries "by the common history 
and culture of the multi-million Russian-speaking population." To Kozyrev, this is 
not imperialism, just reality.69 
Alarmists maintain that the difference between Kozyrev and Zhirinovsky is 
diminishing daily,7o and the historian Yuri N. Afanasyev has observed that 
Kozyrev is learning how to "talk tough foreign policy [in order] to out-Zhirinovsky 
... Zhirinovsky."71 It seems that Kozyrev is somewhat of a political chameleon, 
changing his thinking to conform with public opinion, pressure from the elite or 
the rising legislative voice, or some unseen influence. Whatever the source, in 1994 
it means he's taking a more nationalistic line. 
69Crow, pp. 1-6. 
70"Enter yet another Yeltsin," p. 51. 
71Yuri N. Afanasyev, "Russia's Vicious Circle," The New York Times, 28 
February 1994, p. A-11. 
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Hypothesis 4. Foreign policy will be formulated at the highest levels; the real 
foreign policy decisions will be made by the national leader and a close circle of 
advisors. Executive branches ministries and departments will be relegated to a 
support function. 
This hypothesis is inconclusive, and cannot be properly evaluated at this 
point in time. Nonetheless, some commentary is appropriate. Russia's process for 
the formation of security policy is fragmented.72 On the inter-governmental level, 
the new constitution grants the executive branch extensive power over the 
formulation of foreign policy, compared to the limited powers of the legislative 
branch. Within the executive branch, where most of the power resides, there is a 
second source of fragmentation. The Russian Federation Security Council was 
created in March 1992 as a support mechanism for the presidential decision-making 
process. What began was a very small organization has quickly grown in size and its 
scope of responsibility has greatly increased. After the first year of its existence, 
however, there was tremendous uncertainty surrounding the role of the Council.73 
When Marshal Evgenii Shaposhnikov resigned his post as Chairman of the Council 
on 10 August 1993, speculation began concerning its future role. This speculation 
ranged from the elimination of the Council74 to a widening of responsibilities.75 
There is no longer any doubt about the vitality of the Security Council. 
Today, its staff prepares all paperwork for the Council, provides analysis, and 
controls the implementation of Presidential decisions. Perhaps most importantly, 
72Mikhail Tsypkin, "The Politics of Russian Security Policy," unpublished 
ms., October 1994. 
730ne of the few truly informative discussions of the purpose, organization, 
and composition of the Russian Federation Security Council is found in FBIS, 5 
January 1994, in which there is the translation of an interview with the Deputy 
Secretary of the Security Council, Valeriy L. Manilov. 
74RFE/RL Daily Report, 12 August 1993. 
75RFE/RL Daily Report, 18 August 1993. 
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the Council oversees ten inter-agency cornmissions,76 which establish priorities for 
policy-making, in which the Council is aided by the Research Council of the Security 
Council. Its members are known, but its role in the formulation and 
implementation of foreign policy remains vague. However, it seems that this body 
serves as a focal point for several important policy decisions. As previously noted, 
for example, Russia's new military doctrine was considered in effect once it was 
approved by the Security Council. 
There are other factors in the process of foreign policy formation that appear 
to be gaining in influence. For the first time in history there is a legitimate, 
democratically elected legislative body operating within well-defined powers. 
Foreign policy committees have been established, but there is no provision for the 
inclusion of legislative representation on the Russian Federation Security 
Council.77 The influence of the Duma on foreign policy is unknown at this point in 
time, but is likely very slight. 
Discerning the role the Duma in the formation of Russian contemporary 
foreign policy will be a critical part of determining the role that overall Russian 
domestic politics play in the formation and influence of Russian foreign policy. 
Recalling Miroslav Ninde's work discussed in Chapter II, there are necessary 
elements in a foreign policy that is based upon domestic (read: democratic) 
principles: an elected legislative voice, with a public that is considered to be the 
repository of valid interests and opinions, and governmental candor. The elements 
listed do not yet exist in the Russian Federation, at least in a mature and stable form. 
For now, the influence of Russian domestic politics on foreign policy is unknown. 
76These commissions are as follows: foreign policy, defense, interregional 
affairs (within Russia), public security, information security, scientific and 
technological aspects of the defense industry, environment, economy, health, and 
crime. Tsypkin, ''The Politics of Russian Security Policy," p. 13. 
77See FBIS, 26 November 1993, which listed the current members of the 
Council at that time. FBIS, 5 January 1994, includes a list of council members, by 
portfolio. 
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The role of the military is also unknown. During the first two years of the 
Russian Federation, while debates raged in Moscow over foreign policy and national 
interests, the Red Army was taking matters into their own hands in the neighboring 
nations of the former Soviet Union. With a lack of clear direction from Moscow, 
Russian armed forces were the policymakers, at least in parts of the "near abroad."78 
Russian armed forces in Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, and 
Tadjikistan were enforcing a de facto foreign policy by their actions in support of 
various factions in these regions. Forces are still deployed in these areas. After the 
attacks on the White House last October, it was generally believed that the Russian 
Army completely backed Yeltsin. That is not at all clear today, and despite the 
historical tendency of Russian armed forces to stay detached from politics, the 
Russian military may yet emerge as the ultimate power broker and thus have 
tremendous influence in the realm of foreign policy. 
Recent comments made by the ubiquitous Lt. General Alexander Lebed 
demonstrate the level of domestic political influence held and sometimes used by 
the military. Lebed has stated in interviews with the Russian press that there was 
no putsch (against Mikhail Gorbachev) in August 1991; rather, it was a "brilliantly 
planned and executed, large-scale, unprecedented provocation, in which the roles 
were scripted ... " This provocation made possible the destruction of the 
Communist Party and the liquidation of the U.S.S.R. Lebed, who switched loyalties 
in mid-crisis and thereafter backed Yeltsin, now says he does not consider himself a 
defender of the Russian White House (the parliament and then seat of Yeltsin's 
resistance effort) and regards that event as "the most shameful page in the Russian 
state's history." Lebed made this statement after Yeltsin prevented Defense Minister 
Grachev from removing Lebed from his command in Moldova and transferring 
him to Tadjikistan.79 
78Lough, p. 22. 
79RFE/RL Daily Report, 22 August 1994. 
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Lebed has also been quoted as saying that he may be a candidate in the 1996 
Russian presidential campaignBO; that the Russian troop withdrawal from Germany 
was "idiotic"81; that there was a fifty-fifty chance that discontented elements of the 
Russian armed forces would rebel82. Still he retains in command of the 14th Army. 
Given all of these uncertainties, there is as of yet no basis for stating that 
foreign policy is exclusively in the hands of Boris Yeltsin and his closest advisors.83 
Thus, three of the four strategic culture-oriented hypotheses are supported by 
the "near abroad" test case, and the fourth hypothesis may yet prove true. 
2. Balance of Power 
Hypothesis 5. States will in principle focus on the establishment and maintenance 
of prestige, both at home and abroad. 
This hypothesis is upheld. Every discussion of Russian foreign policy, 
regardless of the official and the position they espouse, begins with the assertion that 
Russia is a great power. This "great power ideology"84 has been a fundamental 
BORFE/RL Daily Report, 22 August 1994. 
81RFE/RL Daily Report, 12 September 1994. 
82RFE/RL Daily Report, 15 September 1994. 
83For an more in-depth analysis of the various factors involved in the 
Russian foreign policy formation process, see Jeff Checkel, "Russian Foreign Policy: 
Back to the Future," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 41, 16 October 1992, pp. 15-
29. Also, for speculation on the relationship between the executive and legislative 
branches vis-a-vis foreign policy in light of constitutional changes that strengthened 
Yeltsin's hand, see Jan S. Adams, "Who Will Make Russia's Foreign Policy in 1994?" 
RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No.6, 11 February 1994, pp. 36-40. 
84Afanasyev. 
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element of Russian Federation foreign policy from the outset of independence in 
January 1992. This is contrary to a common Western belief that the Russian hard 
line in foreign policy is a recent development, as of late 1993 or early 1994 and which 
grew as a result of the strong showing of nationalist factions in the December 1993 
parliamentary elections.85 
Consider the following statements. made throughout the period in 
consideration, from January 1992 until mid-1994, as examples of this fixation "great 
power" status: 
In October 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin spoke to senior officials in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and made the following comments: 
"The only ideology that can be underlying Russian foreign policy 
is the ideology of the interests of the Russian Federation . . . Russia is 
still a great power. Of course, it is living through temporary 
difficulties. But while so are the United States, Britain, Italy, Spain and 
other countries, they don't feel inferior and are free from any complex . 
. . Russia is not a country that can be kept waiting in the anteroom." 86 
In December 1992, Kozyrev declared that "[w]hat is good for Russia and 
consonant with its material and spiritual potential is an effort to help itself join the 
club of first-class European, Asian and American powers ... "87 The following 
month, in January 1993, the journal International Affairs, published by the Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provided a summary of the draft foreign policy concept 
developed by Kozyrev and the Ministry. One of the basic tenets established at the 
outset of the article was that "Russia is to exercise responsibility as a great power for 
85See, for example, Celestine Bohlen, "Nationalist Vote Toughens Russian 
Foreign Policy," The New York Times, 25 January 1994, p. A-4. 
86International Affairs [Moscow], November 1992, inside jacket. 
87Andrei V. Kozyrev, ''To the Readers," International Affairs [Moscow], 
December 1992, p. 4. 
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the maintenance of global and regional stability, the prevention of conflicts, the 
steady promotion of international relations on the principle of the supremacy of 
law, democracy, and human rights."SS In February 1993 Kozyrev began using the 
term "normal great power" to describe Russia's position in the international 
community.s9 In September Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, former Chairman of the 
Security Council, published an article in which he outlined the fundamental 
precepts of the security concept of the Security Council. The first "key module" or 
parameter of this concept is devoted to Russia's place and role in the world today, 
and included in this section is the illustration and demonstration of the geopolitical 
status of Russia as a great power.90 
In March 1994, Andrei Kozyrev wrote a piece for the op-ed page of The New 
York Times under the title, "Don't Threaten Us."91 In this article he asserted that 
"pragmatic politicians" in both the East and West must proceed with the premise 
that, 
"Russia is destined to be a great power, not a junior one. Under 
Communist or nationalist regimes, it would be aggressive and 
threatening power, while under democratic rule it would be peaceful 
and prosperous. But in either case it would be a great power."92 
88"Russia's Foreign Policy Concept," International Affairs [Moscow], January 
1993, p. 14. 
89"What Foreign Policy Russia Should Pursue," International Affairs 
[Moscow], February 1933, p. 3. 
90Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, "A Security Concept for Russia," International 
Affairs [Moscow], October 1993, p. 11. 
91Andrei V. Kozyrev, "Don't Threaten Us," editorial in The New York Times, 
18 March 1994, p. A-11. A nearly identical version of this article appeared in the 
Amsterdam newspaper De Volkskrant (in Dutch) on 22 March 1994 under the 
heading "Russia Is Predestined To Be a Great Power." See FBIS, 22 March 1994. 
92Kozyrev, "Don't Threaten Us." 
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-- ____________________________________ ___. 
Hypothesis 6. In foreign policy, whenever geographically possible, state expansion 
will have as one goal the acquisition and protection of access to the sea. 
This hypothesis appears to be upheld. Russia has not engaged in any 
territorial aggrandizement in an effort to assume control of former ports and littoral 
areas. However, there are known operations in Moldova (the aforementioned 14th 
Army, under Lt-Gen. Lebed), an ongoing dispute with Ukraine over the disposition 
of the Black Sea Fleet, allegations of Russian operations in the Caucasus, and 
alleged Russian support for the Crimean independence movement. The alleged 
actions, if proven, could all serve as indications of Russia's desire to regain greater 
access to the sea, especially when considered in conjunction with the known 
activities previously mentioned. Of particular interest, the Crimean (and ostensibly 
the Ukrainian) port of Sevastapol declared itself to be a Russian port; Ukrainians 
were quick to spot Russian duplicity in this action, but that claim has thus far been 
unfounded. 
As in the Black Sea, there are indications of continued Russian interest in 
maintaining forces and influence in the Baltic Sea region as well. Russia still has 
access to the sea, at St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad,93 and the Russians are pursuing 
a foreign policy that could be interpreted as an attempt to re-exert Russian influence 
over the region-- the Baltic states, in particular. For example, consider remarks by 
Kozyrev at a meeting with the Russian ambassadors serving in the C.I.S. and Baltic 
states concerning Russian interests in those countries: 
The C.I.S. countries and the Baltic are the area in which 
Russia's main vital interests are concentrated. The main threats to 
these interests come from there ... In my view, the framing of the 
93For further discussion of Russia's perspective on the importance of 
Kaliningrad, see Magdalene Hoff and Heinz Timmerman, "Kaliningrad: Russia's 
Future Gateway to Europe?" RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 36, 10 September 
1993, pp. 37-43. 
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question of the total departure and removal of any military presence of 
Russia in the states of the "near abroad" is just as extreme, if not 
extremist, an approach as the idea of the dispatch of tanks to all the 
republics and the establishment of some imperial order in there ... 94 
All three of the Baltic states successfully concluded agreements with Russia 
for the removal of forces; those agreements were implemented before the end of 
September 1994. During the aforementioned negotiations between Russia and 
Estonia on the Russian troop withdrawal and the treatment of ethnic Russians in 
Estonia, the Russian heavy-handed tactics could be interpreted as an effort to regain 
influence in the Baltics, thereby maintaining access to the sea, particularly at the 
former Soviet naval facility at Tallinn, Estonia. 
Hypothesis 7. States will resolutely refuse to suffer territorial loss without a 
struggle, unless there is an equitable exchange of territory (equitable from the 
national perspective) or the strong potential for the development of the economic 
or moral equivalence of territorial domination. 
This hypothesis is upheld. Russia has not engaged in a military struggle for 
lost territory, in stark contrast, for example, with the efforts of the Yugoslav 
National Army to suppress Slovene and Croatian independence movements at the 
outset of Yugoslav dissolution. Confronted by a fundamental crisis of identity 
brought on by the collapse of the Communist Party and Soviet central authority, 
Russia had to first establish political legitimacy at home and separate itself from the 
poisoned legacy of the Soviet system, particularly in relations with the other 
fourteen former Soviet republics. In the end Russia could not recover from this 
revolutionary process before the independence of the other republics was 
established and recognized by the world community. The Russian Army has been 
removed from many of these states, but Russian interest in reestablishing control 
remains. Russia now seems interested in the pursuit of domination on the basis of 
94FBIS, 24 February 1994. 
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economic and moral bases. Hence the general consensus in Moscow and noted 
above, which holds that the eventual return of the "near abroad" to Russian control 
is inevitable. For example, Russians cannot conceive of an independent Ukraine, 
but then again they don't worry too much because from their perspective it is only a 
matter of time before Ukraine "comes home." 
Hypothesis 8. Foreign policy will pursue one of the following methods in seeking to 
establish or maintain a "balance" in the international order: divide and rule, 
compensation, armament, alliance. 
This hypothesis is upheld, and Russia is principally using the methods of 
divide and rule, and alliance. Moscow is using its peacekeeping role as the means of 
dividing and ruling, in some cases by supporting both sides of a regional conflict, as 
in Nagornyy-Karabakh. The alliance method refers to the development of the C.I.S., 
coupled with efforts to discourage NATO (i.e. Partnership for Peace) involvement in 
the "near abroad" states. This development of the C.I.S. and discouragement of 
NATO enlargement is evident at the time of this writing (December 1994). On 1 
December Russia formally deferred its participation in the Partnership for Peace 
Program and denounced NATO's decision to pursue enlargement as announced in 
a communique signed (on 1 December) by NATO foreign ministers. On that day 
Andrei Kozyrev charged NATO with undo haste in the admission of new members 
and the placement of enlargement ahead of the Partnership for Peace program.95 
Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev warned that Russia would "take security 
measures if NATO admits new members" and Belarusian Foreign Minister Valerii 
Tsepkalo that in the event of NATO emergence on Belarus' western border (i.e., in 
Poland) Belarus would refuse NATO cooperation, and that "integration within the 
C.I.S. would then assume a confrontational character toward the West."96 At the 5 
95RFE/RL Daily Report, 2 December 1994. 
96Ibid. 
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December C.S.C.E. summit in Budapest, Boris Yeltsin denounced plans for NATO 
expansion, and warned that Europe was plunging into a "cold peace" through the 
enlargement of NATO. He then spoke on behalf of the "peoples of the C.I.S." and 
claimed that the peoples' desire is "that the C.I.S. continue to grow stronger."97 
All four balance of power-based hypotheses are valid in the "near abroad" test 
case. To summarize, in the examination of Russia's "near abroad" foreign policy 
based upon strategic culture and balance of power, there was not a clear "win" for 
either explanatory theory. 
97RFE/RL Daily Report, 6 December 1994. 
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IV. TEST CASE: THE KURIL ISLANDS 
A. TEST CASE DISCUSSION 
The Kuril Islands lie in a line between the Kamchatka Peninsula in the 
Russian Federation and the Japanese main island of Hokkaido. This position as 
"stepping stones between Kamchatka and Hokkaidol", and as guardian of the 
approaches to the Sea of Okhotsk, has ensured their importance in relations 
between Japan and Russia since initial contact was established between the two 
powers in the eighteenth century. An ongoing dispute between the two states since 
the Soviet occupation of the islands at the close of World War II and centered on 
territory in the southern portion of the island chain, has prevented them from 
concluding a peace treaty following the war. The islands remain strategically, 
economically and politically sensitive to both sides.2 
The Kurils consist of thirty-six islands. Shikotan and the Habomai Islands are 
considered by the Japanese to be an extension of Hokkaido rather than a part of the 
Kuril archipelago. The Russians, however, refer to Shikotan and the Habomais as 
the "little Kurils." The Southern Kurils consist of Kunashir and Iturup. Together 
with Shikotan and the Habomai group, Iturup and Kunashir compose what the 
Japanese commonly call the Northern Territories.3 These four islands are also 
collectively and somewhat ambiguously called the South Kurils, and they are at the 
heart of on ongoing dispute between the Japan and the Russian Federation. The 
terms Central and Northern Kurils are less well defined and have little relevance in 
the discussion of this dispute. 
lJohn J. Stephen, The Kuril Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacific 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1974), p. 2. 
2Ibid., p. 171. 
3David Rees, The Soviet Seizure of the Kuriles (New York: Praeger, 1985), p. x. 
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A comprehensive historical survey of the discovery, exploration and 
development of the Kuril Islands is beyond the purview of this chapter. 
Nonetheless, the long-standing dispute between Japan and Russia over possession 
of the islands is rooted in deeply held convictions based on the historical interplay 
between the two countries, as well as the less concrete myths and perceptions that 
arose from their common interest in the Kurils. It is therefore appropriate to begin 
a discussion of the present Kuril dispute by surveying the history of Russo-Japanese 
relations in the region. 
Soviet and Russian historians claimed that the Kurils were an integral part of 
Russia since the mid-eighteenth century, as the result of "prior discovery, prior 
settlement, and prior development." In this interpretation, Kuril history is a series 
of Russian feats, undermined by Japanese aggression and tsarist appeasement (this 
last concept was obviously a Communist construct designed to discredit any 
concessions made to Japan by the tsars).4 In contrast, the Japanese counter-claim 
stresses the antiquity of Japanese association with the islands. Russian incursions 
fall collectively under the rubric of territorial encroachments 
In the interest of accuracy, it is important to note that neither the Japanese 
nor the Russians were the first inhabitants. The aboriginal culture of the Kuril 
Ainu predated both Japanese and Russian presence. However, the detailed history 
of Ainu associations with Russians and Japanese, while interesting, is of no 
consequence to the current dispute. It is sufficient to state that as the result of 
intrusions and influence by the Japanese and Russians, the Ainu culture itself 
diverged into northern and southern parts. Ultimately, smallpox destroyed the 
southern Ainu while the northern Ainu were all deported to the island of 
Shikotan. These events effectively destroyed Ainu culture as a separate entity.6 
4Ibid., p. 5. 
5Ibid., p. 6. 
6Ibid., pp. 25-28. 
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There were also European claims to the Kurils. The European quest for the 
Kurils dates to the days of Marco Polo, who brought back to the West a description of 
islands to the north of Japan that had so much gold they "do not know what to do 
with it." This myth was perpetuated by the tale of the Portuguese ship that was 
blown off course, where it encountered an island with inhabitants who had so 
much silver and gold that they used them for common utensils. That incident 
reportedly occurred in the year 1582. Maerten Gerritsen Vries, under the auspices of 
the Dutch East Indies Company, was the first European to "discover" the Kurils, in 
1643. He sighted Kunashir, but mistook it for an extension of Hokkaido. He then 
sighted Iturup, which he named Staten Eylandt. He then landed at Urup, which he 
mistook for a western extension of North America. This he claimed for the Dutch 
East Indies Company, and he named it accordingly.7 Those claims were 
subsequently repudiated, however, and other powers aside from Japan and Russia 
have pressed no claim on the islands; the current dispute is a bilateral affair. 
Russians appeared in the region in the seventeenth century. Cossacks, in 
search of pelts, pushed across Siberia, then to the Sea of Okhotsk. Once established 
in this inhospitable region, the lack of resources drove the Russians south in search 
of more fertile land and more temperate climes. Peter the Great's voracious appetite 
for scientific knowledge and discovery inspired imperial patronage for exploration 
of the region and the search for mineral wealth, and the continued search for fur.s 
In 1702, Tsar Peter issued an ukase ordering the subjugation of Kamchatka and the 
collection of information regarding Japan in preparation for opening trade relations; 
the Tsar clearly saw the Kurils as the key to Japan, and his ukase meant that 
Russians would have to advance south from Kamchatka. Exploration began in 1711 
7Ibid., pp. 32-34. 
BGeorge Vemadsky, A History of Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1969), p. 161. 
75 
and was essentially completed with Lieutenant Commander Martin Spanberg's 
survey of the entire island chain in 1739.9 
As for the Japanese, they point to a stone in northern Honshu which bears 
the inscription Nippon chua (center of Japan). This monument is believed to have 
been erected by an eighth century warrior and, according to the Japanese, proves that 
the Kurils and Kamchatka Peninsula fall within a sphere of Japanese influence 
defined by the distance between this monument and Okinawa, which determines 
the radius of this sphere.lO Thus, the Kurils are clearly a Japanese territory. 
The bottom line of the historical debate over the primacy of claims to the 
Kurils is this: both Russians and Japanese claim preeminence in the Kuril Islands, 
and without agreement even on the fundamental point of discovery, there is no 
hope for peaceful settlement without compromise. Soviet (and now Russian) and 
Japanese historians did agree that Russians and Japanese first encountered each 
other in the arc during the eighteenth century. It is also clear, however, that at the 
time of initial exploration, neither side had a clear concept of how far north or south 
in the chain their respective sovereignty fell.ll 
After 1780 the importance of the Kurils as the key to trade with Japan 
diminished because traders sought routes from the Maritime Provinces in the 
Russian Far East directly to Japanese ports. Though the Kurils were no longer the 
exclusive gateway to Japan, they began to grow in terms of perceived economic 
potential: there was an obvious abundance of maritime resources, and a belief that 
the islands possessed large tracts of arable land (mistaken, as it turned out). Colonial 
ventures failed in the harsh environment. Urup was colonized in 1795, then 
abandoned in 1805. But while the Russians saw economic potential in the islands, 
they did not yet appreciate the strategic importance of the chain. Japan still 
9Ibid., pp. 40-41, 47. 
lOibid., p. 51. 
lllbid., pp. 59, 61. 
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maintained a policy of isolation and was no threat. It was not until American and 
English traders extended their reach across the North Pacific that Russia began to see 
the vulnerability of Siberia to incursions from the East.12 
In the initial phase of relations with Russia, Japan appeared willing to open 
up and enter into trade relations. This interest in economic openness raised 
concerns regarding national security in the xenophobic Japanese society of the 
eighteenth century. Increasingly frequent Russian missions to Japan, and the 
presence of the Russian colony at Urup (until 1805) increased Japanese sensitivities 
and led the shogunate to turn away from trade relations and instead to press for 
greater exploration and development of the islands. From 1799 to 1807 there were 
two principle objectives of Japanese activity in the islands: (1) turn Iturup into an 
impregnable bastion against Russian encroachment; and (2) eliminate the Russian 
colony at Urup. Clearly the Japanese regarded the development of the Kurils as a 
strategic matter: the Kurils were to serve as the buffer between their empire and the 
expanding Russian influence. Japanese wariness regarding Russian intentions 
persisted for the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Russians sent an expedition to Japan in 1853, which was led by Admiral 
Putiatin. He had three goals: open regular diplomatic relations, establish 
commercial relations, and settle the frontier questions in the Kurils and on 
Sakhalin Island.13 As a result of Putiatin's efforts, the Treaty of Shimoda was signed 
on 7 February 1855. This document provided the first demarcation of a frontier 
between Russia and Japan, at least in the Kurils. The boundary was fixed between 
Iturup and Urup, and the question of Sakhalin territorial settlement was left open to 
further negotiations.14 
12Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
13Stephen, p. 86. 
14Ibid., p. 88. 
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The Treaty of Shimoda remained in effect until the Treaty of St. Petersburg 
was signed on 7 May 1875. This treaty stated that in return for Russian acquisition of 
the entire island of Sakhalin, Japan would receive full title to "the group of the 
Kuril Islands" then possessed by the Tsar. These islands were then enumerated, 
from Urup north to Shumshu (which is the northernmost island in the 
archipelago, and is situated across the First Kuril Strait from Cape Lopatka, a mere 
seven miles from Kamchatka Peninsula). Additionally, the Japanese were granted 
fishing and commercial privileges around the Sea of Okhotsk littoral, including 
Kamchatka.15 Today, it seems incredible that the Russians would so readily 
relinquish all claims to the islands. The 1870's witnessed the continued rise of 
nationalism as a force of change, and that decade marked the beginning of the age of 
European imperialism, when several of the great powers were preoccupied with the 
acquisition and protection of territory as a source of both prestige and economic 
gain. This treaty between Tsar and Emperor is perhaps best understood as one of 
the last agreements concluded between absolute rulers exercising their authority 
granted by mandate from heaven. The exchange of territory was a gesture of 
goodwill that only absolute sovereigns could conclude. The spread of nationalism 
to Japan and Russia would prevent the settlement of future agreements on similar 
terms. 
Nonetheless, the Treaty of St. Petersburg kept the peace for the next twenty-
nine years, and it remained in effect for a total of seventy years. Although there 
were no territorial concessions in the Kurils as a result of the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904-05, in the Treaty of Portsmouth Japan received additional fishing concessions 
of the coast of Kamchatka Peninsula, and this access to rich fishing grounds fueled a 
remarkable growth in the Japanese fishing industry in the Kuril Islands in th~ 
15Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), p. 390. 
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decades that followed.16 Russia, and consequently the Soviet Union, and Japan then 
entered a period characterized by fairly benign relations, although Japanese 
expansion on the Asiatic mainland contributed to an increase in tensions between 
Japan and the Soviet Union. This tension climaxed in 1938 and 1939 when fighting 
between their armies erupted in the Chang-Kuping hills near Lake Hasan, in the 
region of the Mogolian border. The Soviets gained the upper hand in these 
conflicts, but they ended as abruptly as they began.17 No general settlement was ever 
concluded and the two sides resumed a wary peace.18 Perhaps the best explanation 
of Soviet disinterest in the region after 1905 is that they were otherwise occupied in 
the years after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War. These distractions took 
many forms: first, with social unrest and attempted domestic reform; then the First 
World War; the revolutions of 1917; the Russian Civil War; the great social reforms 
of collectivization and industrialization; and finally the rise of Hitler. In short, the 
Russians and their Soviet successors had to deal with several threats that were 
closer to the heartland before turning their attention to the Far East. 
The Soviets first expressed irredentist claims to the islands in 1940. 
Significantly, these claims included not only the northern and central Kurils, but 
the Southern Kurils and the "little Kurils" as well -- the first time Russia pressed 
claims so far south.19 This demand was first expressed in negotiations between the 
Soviet Union and Japan designed to ensure Soviet neutrality in the event of a 
16Rees, p. 23. 
17Berhard Pares, A History of Russia (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), p. 
524. 
18The Soviets worked hard to carefully maintain this delicate neutrality with 
Japan during the course of the war. It was not until February 1945 that Stalin finally 
pledged to break the neutrality with Japan-- ninety days after Germany was defeated. 
Vemadsky, p. 449. 
19Ibid., p. 152. 
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second general war. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov hinted very directly that the 
Soviets expected a "present" in return for such an agreement -- that present being 
the Kurils.20 At the time the Japanese were negotiating from a position of strength 
and could afford to refuse such an overture. Japan and the Soviet Union signed a 
Neutrality Pact on 13 April 1941 without reference to the Kurils.21 This 
arrangement remained in place until the Soviets declared war on Japan in the final 
three weeks of the war. 
After April1941, the issue was next raised by the Soviets in a very different 
context, this time in conferences among the Allied powers in which the post-war 
disposition of Japan was discussed. The Cairo Declaration, issued in 1942 at the 
conclusion of that conference made a passing reference that " ... Japan will [] be 
expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed."22 At 
the Teheran Conference of November 1943 Stalin first hinted that the Soviet Union 
was interested in acquiring Sakhalin and the Kurils to order to gain unrestricted 
access to the Pacific, and to provide a layer of defense for the Far East. On two other 
occasions Stalin mentioned this interest, including a December 1943 meeting with 
presidential envoy Averell Harriman, in which Stalin specified that the Kurils 
should be "returned" to the Russians -- with the obvious implication that the 
islands had been previously owned by them.23 
U. S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt apparently had little knowledge of the 
Kurils, and even less interest. Possibly the Soviet rhetoric regarding the "return" of 
the Kurils had its desired effect, because Roosevelt believed that Japan had been 
20Rees, p. 33. 
2llbid., p. 36. 
22United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1943, the Conferences of Cairo and Teheran, Washington, 1961, pp. 448-9. 
23Stephen, p. 153. 
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awarded the islands as a result of the 1904-05 war; he believed this at Teheran, and 
apparently no one had corrected him by the time he reached Yalta. However, 
despite Roosevelt's lack of accurate information concerning the historical 
disposition of the Kuril Islands, there is little evidence to suggest that the facts 
would have changed his approach to negotiating for Soviet participation in the war 
against Japan. Roosevelt wanted the Soviet Union in the Pacific war; if the Kurils 
were the key to securing Soviet participation, then Roosevelt was probably more 
than willing to award the islands to the Soviets. He certainly wasted no time in 
endorsing Stalin's proposal. At Yalta he quickly agreed with Stalin's request that the 
Soviets take back the Kurils and southern Sakhalin as a fair way of "get[ting] back 
that which [was] taken from them." All of this was covered quickly during a fifteen 
minute closed meeting on 8 February 1944.24 The 26 July 1945 Postdam Declaration 
remained ambiguous regarding the Kurils, but could be interpreted as an 
endorsement of the Yalta Declaration, which was not specifically referred to: " the 
terms of the Cairo Declaration will be carried out and Japanese sovereignty will be 
limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor 
islands as we determine."25 
The Japanese did consider offering concessions to the Soviet Union in 1944, 
which would have included the transfer of titles to the Central and Northern Kurils 
to the Soviets as a means of maintaining Soviet neutrality.26 And in July 1945 Japan 
undertook to send a special envoy to Moscow to negotiate the end of war, and to 
include in a list of proposed concessions to the Soviets the Central and Northern 
Kurils. The Southern Kurils, however, remained "inalienable."27 The Soviets 
24Ibid., pp. 153-155. 
25Rees, p. 72. 
26Ibid., p. 55. 
27Ibid., p. 71. 
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refused this last offer, and the following month the extent of their interest in the 
Kurils was made clear. On 18 August 1945, three days after the Emperor of Japan 
declared Japan's unconditional surrender, Soviet forces invaded Shumshu and 
Paramuchir. The Japanese forces initially resisted and inflicted heavy casualties, but 
after they were ordered to effect an unconditional surrender (which they did on 23 
August), the Soviets occupied all the Kurils, including Shikotan and the Habomai 
group.28 The Soviets cut all communications between Japan and the islands, and 
soon thereafter annexed the territory into the Soviet Union. 
At the San Francisco Peace Conference on 4-8 September 1951, Japanese Prime 
Minister Yoshida signed a treaty which renounced all Japanese claims to Sakhalin 
and the Kuril Islands. The Japanese subsequently argued that the term "Kuril 
Islands" meant only the islands north of and including Urup; Iturup and Kunashir 
were excluded from this agreement.2 9 
A Peace Declaration was signed by Japan and the Soviet Union in October 
1956, but in this document territorial matters were deferred until a full-fledged peace 
treaty could be negotiated. As part of that agreement, the Soviet Union pledged to 
return Shikotan and the Habomais to Japan upon the conclusion of a general peace 
treaty.30 In January 1960, still without a peace treaty, the Soviets added the 
stipulation that Shikotan and the Habomais would be returned to Japan only after 
all foreign bases and troops were withdrawn from Japan and a peace treaty was 
signed between Tokyo and Moscow. This was an obvious reaction to the U.S.-
Japanese Security Agreement of January 1960.31 
28Stephen, pp. 167-168. 
29Ibid., p. 199. 
30Ibid., p. 201. 
31Rees, p. 120. 
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Concerning fishing rights, throughout the entire period from the conclusion 
of the Treaty of St. Petersburg, until the signing of the Peace Declaration in 1956, 
Japan consistently maintained that it had monopoly use of the crab and fish 
resources in the seas adjacent to the Russian Far East, as well as in coastal waters. 
This was expressed in the treaties of 1875 and 1905, the 1907 and 1928 fishing 
conventions, and the 1956 convention.32 
In the seventies the Soviet Union claimed the application of the Final Act of 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1973-1975, commonly 
known as the Helsinki Accords, to the dispute.33 Among many other points, this 
document endorsed the principle of the inviolability of post-war borders.34 That 
argument conveniently ignored the fact that the Helsinki agreement was a strictly 
European document and did not apply to this Asian case. In 1976-77 both the Soviet 
Union and Japan claimed Exclusive Economic Zones (E.E.Z.'s) around the disputed 
islands. In practice, however, Russia controlled the waters and Japanese fishermen 
were required to obtain licenses, or risk the consequences of poaching, if caught.35 
The extension of Exclusive Economic Zones to two hundred miles only served to 
aggravate the dispute, because both Japan and the Soviet Union claimed a 200 mile 
E.E.Z. around the South Kuril Islands. 
Near the end of Mikhail Gorbachev's tenure, the "Kuril problem" became a 
source of contention within the Soviet Union. It was used by members of the 
32Vyacheslav Zilanov, "Has the Kurils Trap Snapped Shut? Or, Where B. 
Yeltsin Lost toM. Gorbachev." Moscow Rabochaya Tribuna, 24 June 1994, pp. 1,4 as 
reported in FBIS, 28 June 1994. 
33R ·· ees, p. xu. 
34The Final Act is reproduced in its entirety in John J. Maresca, To Helsinki: 
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1973-1975 (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1985). 
35J. R. V. Prescott, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (Methuen 
& Co., 1985), p. 248. 
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"democratic" opposition-- including Boris Yeltsin -- as a political instrument in the 
struggle for power. Y eltsin made a series of statements in September and October of 
1988 in which he proposed the return of the South Kurils to Japan. His proposal 
would more accurately be called a joint use venture as a symbol of a new era of 
cooperation between the two countries. Later proposals included the sale of the 
islands by Russia to Japan for some twenty to fifty billion dollars. Then, as chairman 
of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) Supreme Soviet, YeHsin 
proposed a five step plan for the peaceful settlement of the dispute with Japan: 
1. Official recognition of a territorial dispute 
2. Demilitarization of the islands 
3. Declaration of the islands as free economic zone 
4. Signing a formal peace treaty 
5. Establishment of a joint protectorate over the islands36 
Despite these promising proposals by Yeltsin, however, the official policy of 
the Russian Federation remains identical to Soviet policy: the issue was settled at 
Yalta; the Kurils were awarded to the Soviet Union at Yalta, and the Kurils are the 
spoils of war. Russia is the successor state of the Soviet Union and the Kurils are 
therefore rightfully and legally sovereign Russian territory.37 
Marine industries continue to be the mainstay of Russian economic activity 
in the Far East. One-third of the Russian Pacific catch is processed in the Kurils. 
Several whaling factories are located there, and Malokurilsk on Shikotan is the 
main base for the Russian Pacific whaling fleet. The mineral wealth of the region 
has been of increasing interest of late: bauxite, zirconium, gold, zinc, mercury, tin, 
36FBIS, 28 June 1994. 
37for additional commentary on the on-going dispute, see Stephen Foye, 
"Russo-Japanese Relations: Still Traveling a Rocky Road," RFE/RL Research Report, 
Vol. 2, No. 44, 5 November 1993, pp. 27-34. 
84 
tungsten, lead, copper, sulphur, pumice, perlite are all mined in the islands. Of 
note, titanium-magnetite -- a vital component in the construction of naval 
combatants, space craft, and heavy industrial equipment-- is mined from sand 
deposits off Iturup -- one of the disputed southern islands.38 
Over a third of Japan's catch also comes from the North Pacific, near the 
Kurils. Prior to 1945, the Japanese could fish Soviet waters with impunity, but in 
the decades since the Soviets have stepped up efforts to deter encroachment 
increasing border guard patrols, seizing boats and detaining fishermen.39 
Nevertheless, Japan continues to ply its fishing trade in disputed waters. Japan 
relies more heavily on its harvest from Russian waters than does Russia rely on 
Japanese maritime products. The countries signed an interim accord on fishing in 
1977, but Moscow still possesses the leverage of occupation. Some Japanese 
businesses are opposing the Japanese government official stand on the territorial 
dispute because it will negate informal concessions now in effect that benefit 
Japanese fishermen.40 It is Japan's hope that its fishing industry can make up for the 
loss in total catch production that came as a result of the E.E.Z. extension policies by 
gaining additional territorial seas and E.E.Z.'s by the reclamation of the South 
Kurils. This additional catch would represent an additional two million tons of fish 
annually.41 
In April 1994 Russia announced its intention to tighten law enforcement 
efforts against poaching boats under the auspices of an operation code-named 
"Putina 94." This operation includes the mobilization of the Border Patrol, local 
government authorities, the Russian Pacific Fleet, and even the use of 
38Stephen, p. 175. 
39R .. ees, p. xvn. 
40Ib'd .. d=.t p. xvn. 
4lfBIS, 28 June 1994. 
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reconnaissance space satellites. Russia took this step with the stated purpose of 
protecting its economic interests "as an economic major power."42 In information 
released in conjunction with "Putina 94," Russian border guards estimated that 
more than 7,000 incursions by Japanese vessels in the Russian waters were 
registered last year,and they also acknowledged that poachers are apprehended only 
infrequently .43 According to official statements, "Putina 94" is not aimed at a 
cohersive resolution of the unlawful fishing; rather, it is mainly an attempt to deter 
Japanese poachers from entering Russian territorial seas.44 
The Russians show no signs of pulling back from the Kurils, at least not in 
the sense of relinquishing sovereignty over the islands. In the Russian 1994 Federal 
Budget, 85 billion rubles were allocated to a federal program titled ''The Social and 
Economic Development of the Kuril Islands for 1994, 1995, and Through 2000." 
Included in this allocation is funding for the construction or modernization of 
airports, seaports, as well as developments in the power industry, air transportation, 
and communications.45 The Russians have recently published reports detailing 
plans to exploit the geothermal energy of the region.46 
Russians emphasize the developed sense of pride among the island 
inhabitants; two generations have now lived in the settlements; they consider 
4Zfokyo Asahi Shimbun, 20 April1994, p. 3, as reported in FBIS, 20 April1994. 
43"Fish: The Japanese Are Asking Us Not To Fire. Tokyo Advises Its 
Fishermen Not To Mess With 'Putina 94,"' Moscow Segodnya, 22 April1994, p. 2 as 
reported in FBIS, 22 April1994. 
44Ibid. 
45"Govemment Is Allocating 85 Billion Rubles to South Kurils," Moscow 
Izvestiya, 12 May 1994, p. II, as reported in FBIS, 12 May 1994. 
46Moscow Teploenergetika, Number 2, 1994, pp. 15-22 as reported in FBIS, 9 
August 1994. 
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themselves hearty, frontier stock.47 This year, however, there have been signs that 
pride is cracking. In June, 1994, a group of Kuril Islands citizens appealed to the 
Russian President, the Federal Assembly and the oblast governor describing their 
"disastrous economic situation." 48 It has been reported in the Russian press that 
residents in the Kurils have requested aid from the Japanese government to finance 
their return to the Russian mainland. And there is rising concern in Moscow over 
the number of Russians migrating off the islands.49 Emigration off Shikotan and 
Kunashir (in the South Kurils) have reached "massive" proportions, with 800 
residents having left in the first six months of 1994. Reasons cited for leaving 
include worsening economic and social conditions, and rising unemployment.SO 
In March 1994, the Chairman of the State Duma Security Committee reported 
to the Duma that the executive branch has prepared an instruction directing the 
Defense Ministry to prepare plans for the withdrawal of forces from the South 
Kurils.Sl The Defense Ministry denied receiving any such directive.52 It appears 
that the chairman was engaged in political maneuvering rather than exposing 
executive duplicity. As in Japan, in the Russian Federation the Kurils have 
developed into a powerful and complex political symbol. In March 1994 Prime 
47Stephen, p. 181. 
48Moscow Russian Television and Dubl Networks, 0600 GMT I June 1994 as 
reported in FBIS, 1 June 1994. 
49RFE/RL Daily Report, 11 August 1994. 
SORFE/RL Daily Report, 11 August 1994. 
51Moscow Inter{ax, 1129 GMT, 23 March 1994 as reported in FBIS, 23 March 
1994. 
52''Border Guards Have Not Left the Kurils Yet. Russia Intends to Guard' All 
That Coincides With ex-USSR Borders."' Moscow Segodnya, 23 March 1994, p. 2 as 
reported in FBIS, 23 March 1994. 
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Minister Victor Chernomyrdin stated that there is no territorial problem with 
J apan53 -- this the continuation of the Soviet "the problem was solved at Yalta" line. 
The governor of Primorsky Krai in the Russian Far East has proposed that the Kuril 
Islands be transferred to his jurisdiction, and has emphatically opposed any 
concession of any Russian territory to neighboring states (a veiled reference to the 
Kurils).S4 The ubiquitous ultra-nationalist legislator Vladimir Zhirinovsky stated 
on 28 July 1994 that Russia would never give up the Kurils, and threatened to 
invade Tokyo if Japan did not renounce its claim.ss Ivan Rybkin, speaker of the 
State Duma, and a member of one of the opposition parties, has stated that the 
"Kurils are our own Russian islands ... We cannot afford to lose such beauty." 56 
Gennadi Burbulis, a former Yeltsin aide and now a member of the Liberal 
Democratic opposition party (which is neither), has stated that the Soviet seizure of 
the Kurils was an aggression by Stalin and that Russia would eventually have to 
come to terms with returning the islands.57 It is difficult to take the hyperbole of 
Zhirinovskiy and Rybkin seriously, but these statements clearly indicate that the 
Kuril Islands issue has become deeply politicized in the developing Russian political 
environment. 
In August 1994 new complications arose. Russia and Japan exchanged 
diplomatic protests on 16 August 1994 following an incident the previous day in 
which a Russian border guard vessel opened fire on two Japanese boats fishing in 
waters off of the Southern Kurils. One vessel was hit and subsequently detained; 
53Moscow Russian Television Network, 1700 GMT, 20 March 1994 as reported 
in FBIS, 20 March 1994. 
54RFE/RL Daily Report, 2 August 1994. 
SSRFE/RL Daily Report, 29 July 1994. 
56RFE/RL Daily Report, 29 June 1994. 
S7RfE/RL Daily Report, 14 April1994. 
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one Japanese crew member was wounded. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Panov 
told the Japanese ambassador in Moscow that he wanted "an end to illegal fishing 
activities in the waters off the disputed islands," then refused to hear a Japanese 
reciprocal protest.SS 
Geography has predisposed the Kurils to play a strategic role in Russo-
Japanese affairs. During the eighteenth century, Russia saw the islands as the 
gateway to Japan. In turn, the Japanese have viewed the islands as a "springboard 
aimed at the Russian Far East.59 That geostrategic importance continues today. 
Several strategically significant straits pass between the islands. The Kuril Strait, 
which separates Lopatka Peninsula and Shimshu Island, is only seven miles wide. 
The three mile wide channel is only 50-100 feet deep, with dangerous reefs 
extending from Lopatka Peninsula and the northeast point of Shimshu. This 
narrow and treacherous body was the frontier between Japan and Russia and the 
U.S.S.R. from 1875-1945. There are other passes in the archipelago. Paramushir 
Strait, which separates Paramushir and Shimshu, is one mile wide at its narrowest. 
Shimushir Strait, between Shimushir and Ketoi, is eleven miles wide and very 
deep. Iturup Strait, between Iturup and Urup, is 24 miles wide and deep. In the 1855 
Treaty of Shimoda, this strait served as the frontier. The final strait, between 
Kunashir and Hokkaido, is twelve miles wide and very deep.60 
Ironically, the Russians began to appreciate the strategic value of the islands 
in about 1875, at the time they signed over possession of all the islands to the 
Japanese in the Treaty of St. Petersburg. This was largely due to the influence of 
Admiral Stepan Makarov, who pointed to the Kurils as the key to communication 
between the Russian Far East and the Pacific Ocean. Short of possession, Makarov 
SSRFE/RL Daily Report, 17 August 1994. 
59Stephen, p. 127. 
60"Kuril Islands," United States Nayy Handbook, 1943, as quoted in Rees, pp. 
156-165. 
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recognized the need for detailed information of the entire chain, especially the 
passages. His emphasis lead to the detailed exploration and charting of the islands 
and passages.61 This is not to say that Russians were completely insensitive to 
strategic considerations before Makarov. In 1746 a member of Bering's second 
expedition first proposed the placement of a naval base as a means of protecting the 
eastern approaches to Siberia.62 The strategic significance of the islands assumed 
new importance in the middle of the nineteenth century for several reasons. The 
most prominent of these reasons were the expansion of American influence into 
the Pacific region, Russian absorption the Amur-Maritime region and penetration 
into Manchuria, and deepening Japanese involvements in Asian and Pacific 
affairs.63 
It was not until 1885 that the Japanese truly began to appreciate the strategic 
importance of the Kurils. In that year a Cabinet official toured the islands and 
articulated the vulnerability of the exposed, undeveloped lands to Russian 
encroachment. He saw that the northernmost islands abutted Russian territory, and 
remained unprotected. Poachers frequented the islands. Russian naval vessels 
routinely patrolled the territorial waters, conducting topographic and oceanographic 
surveys.64 It was in this period, when the Japanese controlled the entire 
archipelago, that they began to build a military presence in the region. More 
importantly, their access to the rich fishing grounds along the Russian littoral 
caused them to develop the Kurils as a commercial base for their growing industry. 
By the 1910's- 1920's the Japanese were brazenly operating in Russian territorial 
waters. However, the Russians were in a period of weakness in the years bracketing 
61Stephen, p. 129. 
62Ibid., p. 185. 
63Ibid., pp. 127-128. 
64Ibid., p. 111. 
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the Russian Revolution. As a result, the Japanese fished openly in Russian waters, 
often under the watchful protection of Japanese naval vessels. Warships cut 
towlines as Russian attempted to tow poachers into custody.65 
Throughout World War II, the Soviets had one overriding strategic goal in 
the Pacific-- acquisition of the Kurils. This grew from the realization, based on 
historical experience, of the strategic importance of the islands.66 During the war, 
in order to reach Vladivostok, American lend-lease vessels had to sail through 
either the Tartary or the La Perouse Strait, between Sakhalin and the Russian 
mainland. In either case, the ships had to proceed via the Kuril Island passages, all 
of which were controlled by the Japanese. The Russians, however, were desperate 
and therefore took their chances. Particularly during the early stages of the war, 
Japanese patrols frequently stopped, searched, detained and confiscated several 
shipments. They also required advance notice and daytime passage. The Kuril 
Strait, between Kamchatka and Shumshu, was on the shortest route from the U.S., 
but it was narrow and was rimmed on the northern side by the aforementioned reef. 
Shipping was required, therefore, to pass through Japanese waters on the south side 
of the channel. After August 1943, the Japanese Imperial Headquarters ordered a 
halt to all harassment (most likely in observation of the Neutrality Pact.)67 This 
wartime experience reenforced Admiral Makarov's emphasis on the strategic 
importance of the Kurils in providing unrestricted access to the Pacific Basin. 
Japanese use of the islands during the war demonstrated the military significance of 
the islands themselves to the Russians. Hitokappu Bay, at Iturup, served as the 
rendezvous point for the strike fleet that attacked Pearl Harbor. It later served as the 
launching point for the expeditionary force that occupied the western Aleutians, on 
65Ibid., p. 130. 
66Ibid., p. 133. 
67Ibid., pp. 145-146. 
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8 June 1942.68 After World War II, Badger and Bear air bases were constructed on 
Iturup and Paramushir. Submarine facilities were constructed at Buroton Bay.69 
The Sea of Okhotsk is widely believed to have served as a SSBN bastion, which 
would make the Kurils and the straits central to Soviet and thence Russian nuclear 
and strategic objectives.70 
Western diplomats have typically granted only grudging acknowledgement of 
the strategic importance of the Kurils to the Russians and Soviets. Henry Kissinger 
stated that Stalin's claim to the southern Kurils "did bear a certain, albeit vague, 
relationship to Soviet security and Russian history."71 A statement in Stalin's 
victory speech perhaps best sums the weight that Russians place on the Kurils as a 
strategically vital piece of territory: "Henceforth, the Kuril Islands shall not serve as 
a means to cut off the Soviet Union from the ocean or as a base for a Japanese attack 
on our Far East, but as a means to link the Soviet Union with the ocean and as a 
defensive base against Japanese aggression."72 The strategic significance of these 
islands has not diminished today, and Stalin's quote is still applicable by simply 
substituting the word "any" for "Japanese." 
Today, Moscow ultimately values the islands for their strategic importance as 
a protective shield for the Russian Far East, although it is unclear what threat the 
Russians are concerned about. The Kurils also serve as an outpost to support 
presence in the Pacific Basin.73 Kunashir and Iturup offer a proximity to Japan that 
68Ibid., p. 138. 
69Ibid., p. 186. 
70Ib'd .. ~p.xvu  
71Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 415. 
72Stephen, p. 170. 
73Ibid., p. 4. 
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gives them a base for advance airfields and intelligence operations. Buroton Bay on 
Shimushir is a "natural" submarine base. The islands lie along the air route 
between North America and the Far East. Of fourteen major eastern Russian ports, 
eleven are separated from the Pacific by the Kurils. While the Tsushima Strait is 
closely guarded by South Korea, Japan, and with an American naval base in close 
proximity at Sasebo, the Kuril gateways are vital to Russian Pacific Fleet access to the 
open Pacific. In the broader context of Russian state security, there is a vital issue of 
economic integrity -- that is, the protection of Russian sea expanses, including the 
200 mile E.E.Z. and the continental shel£.74 
Captain Boris Makeev, Russian Navy (retired) listed the main tenets of 
Russian naval strategy in the Pacific Region (as of the fall of 1994). These tenets 
included the following: 
1. Provide for combat stability of SSBN's 
2. Prevent amphibious landings in the Russian Far East 
3. Provide air cover for Kamchatka, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the northern Sea of 
Japan 
4. Protect Russian economic interests in the region 
5. Deter territorial claims in the region.75 
Each of these tenets provides an indication of the Russian resolve to 
maintain control over the Kurils, because in each case possession of the Kurils and 
the surrounding waters is critical to the achievement of these goals. Provision for 
the combat stability of ballistic missile submarines in the Pacific theater dictates the 
necessity of protecting the bastion in which they operate, the Sea of Okhotsk.76 The 
best method of protecting this area is by controlling the approaches to the sea, that is, 
74FBIS, 28 June 1994. 
75Captain Boris Makeev, Russian Navy (Retired), in a lecture at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 5 October 1994. 
76Ibid. 
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the Kuril straits, and the Tartary and La Perouse Straits. Prevention of the landing 
of enemy amphibious forces in the Russian Far East is likewise best achieved by 
controlling the approaches to the Russian coast, and much of the Russian Far East is 
accessible via the Kurils straits or the Tsushima Strait. The air cover mission is the 
weakest argument for maintaining Russian presence in and control of the Kurils; 
nonetheless, it provides a convenient reason, albeit a questionable one, for the 
maintenance of Russian air bases in the Kurils. The need to protect Russian 
economic interests in the region is currently a high priority; hence the use of 
Russian naval forces in the recent "Putina 94" exercises designed to deter poaching 
by Japanese fishermen. The goal of deterring territorial claims is obvious. The 
explicit purpose of using the defense of Russian territorial claims as a justification 
for maintaining naval force levels indicates the importance of the issue. 
B. HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
1. Strategic Culture 
Hypothesis 1. States will have a preoccupation with security, demonstrating 
particular concern regarding loss of strategic depth, or the reduction of space 
between the frontiers and the heartland. 
This hypothesis appears to be upheld in this test case. Despite the desperate 
economic plight of Russian inhabitants and the current exodus by Russian citizens 
from the islands, the Russians will not consider withdrawal from the Kurils. The 
archipelago has become an integral part of the perceived critical line of defense on 
the country's periphery. In the highly politicized environment of Moscow, began in 
Gorbachev's era of perestroika, perpetuated with Yeltsin's assent to power, an~ 
continued today with the development of party politics, the mere mention of 
"retreat'' from the Kurils is politically damaging. 
Perhaps one reason for this particular sensitivity to the possible "loss" of the 
Kurils is the political organization of the islands within the region. The Kurils are 
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administratively under the direct control of the Russian Federation. Having "lost" 
all of the other Soviet Socialist Republics, and faced with rebellion from other 
autonomous republics and regions within the Russian Federation (such as 
Chechnya) it is unpalatable to the Russians to lose territory under the direct political 
administration of Moscow. 
Hypothesis 2 States will pursue expansion as a means of gaining or regaining 
secure borders. 
This hypothesis is not upheld in this test case. The Russians have no interest 
in expansion in the region, at least in the immediate area of the Kurils. The 
Russians have never claimed any portion of the Japanese mainland.77 Their sole 
interest is to maintain their current territorial possessions, prevent Japanese 
economic exploitation (that is, fishing in Kuril Island waters) and gain Japanese and 
international recognition for their claim. As noted in the analysis of Hypothesis 1, 
however, any territorial concession would meet with intense political opposition 
and would be seriously damaging to the regime's credibility. 
Hypothesis 3. States will appeal to nationalistic sentiment as a means of garnering 
public support for foreign policy objectives. 
This hypothesis is upheld, based upon the extensive rhetoric that 
encompasses political debate in Moscow over the future disposition of the Kurils. 
Russian politicians are beginning to understand the power of nationalism as a force 
77fhis statement requires some qualification; after the conclusion of the' war 
in the Pacific, Stalin did request that the Red Army establish and administer a zone 
of occupation in northern Hokkaido, modelled after the German occupation. 
President Truman steadfastly refused on the grounds that the Postdam Declaration 
provided for a consolidated administration over the defeated, occupied Japan. See 
Rees and Stephen. In retrospect, this effort by Stalin to gain a foothold on Hokkaido 
can be viewed as a territorial claim, but as a claim made on the basis of historical, 
cultural ties to the region, it is unfounded. 
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in Russian society, particularly in a society in which the previous regime suffered a 
crippling and demoralizing Cold War "defeat" at the hands of the United States, and 
in which a large portion of the Russian empire was lost, including the cradle of 
Russian civilization, Ukraine. There is clearly a "market" for revitalized 
nationalism as a elixir to soothe the bruised Russian national pride, and politicians 
are seizing on nationalistic sentiment as a means of garnering support for their 
movements. This is true not only of the opposition parties and leaders, but for the 
government as well, which must respond to the attacks of opposition leaders. In 
this respect, because of the politicization of such issues, contemporary Russian 
foreign policy must appeal to nationalistic sentiment. 
An appeal to Russian nationalistic sentiment is the only way to understand 
Rybkin' s statement regarding the "beauty" of the Kuril Islands, Zhirinovsky' s 
ridiculous threat to invade Tokyo. The same applies to other less ridiculous but 
equally effective statements that are clearly designed to appeal to Russian 
nationalism, and thereby prevent any deal with Japan that involves concession or 
compromise. 
Hypothesis 4. Foreign policy will be formulated at the highest levels; the real 
foreign policy decisions will be made by the national leader and a close circle of 
advisors. Executive branches ministries and departments will be relegated to a 
support function. 
As was true in the "near abroad" test case, this hypothesis is inconclusive. A 
variety of "players" within the government, including Boris Yeltsin, Viktor 
Chernomyrdin, and Ivan Rybkin have made contradictory statements regarding the 
Kuril dispute, and it is as of yet extremely difficult to determine the mechanisms 
and the processes by which Russian foreign policy is developed. 
Two of the four strategic culture hypotheses were upheld in this test case. 
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2. Balance of Power 
Hypothesis 5. States will in principle focus on the establishment and maintenance 
of prestige, both at home and abroad. 
This hypothesis is upheld. The review of Russian policy statements 
concerning the Kurils indicates an goal of preserving Russia's status as a great 
power. In statements aimed at a domestic audience, officials have made foreign 
policy statements that Russia will never relinquish its claim on the Kurils; they are 
indisputably Russian territory. Any other line of policy would be exploited by 
opposition parties and factions as a sign of weakness on the part of the Russian 
government. 
The recent Russian display of resolve through the mobilization of resources 
to deter Japanese poaching in the Kurils provides further evidence of Russian 
resolve. The extensive poaching by Japanese commercial fishing fleets is an affront 
to Russian prestige and sovereignty in the region, and the exercise "Putina 94" is a 
clear indication of Russia's desire to regain control of the economic development of 
the region. 
Hypothesis 6. In foreign policy, whenever geographically possible, state expansion 
will have as one goal the acquisition and protection of access to the sea. 
This hypothesis is upheld, and is perhaps the single best example in this 
thesis of the validity of Realpolitik as a basis for the evaluation of contemporary 
Russian foreign policy. All other considerations aside, the Russians want to keep to 
Kurils to protect their strategic interests in the region, which include unhindered 
access to the Pacific Basin. Possession of the Kuril Islands gives Russia control of 
vital straits between the open ocean and the northern approaches to Vladivostok 
via the Sea of Okhotsk. The lessons of the vulnerability of shipping in the First 
Kuril Strait during World War II were not lost on them. The islands also provide 
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an important layer of outer defense against attack on the motherland, and guard the 
approaches to the Russian SSBN bastion in the Sea of Okhotsk. 
The aforementioned exercise "Putina 94" is again an example of Russian 
resolve to establish and maintain dominance on the waters around the Kuril 
Islands. 
Hypothesis 7. States will resolutely refuse to suffer territorial loss without a 
struggle, unless there is an equitable exchange of territory (equitable from the 
national perspective) or the strong potential for the development of the economic 
or moral equivalence of territorial domination. 
This hypothesis is upheld; the political bluster in Moscow over the 
disposition of the islands may be filled with hyperbole, but it is nonetheless a clear 
demonstration of Russia's "resolute refusal" to suffer the loss of sovereign Russian 
territory.78 Following the premise of this hypothesis, the only possible resolution of 
the conflict with Japan aside from Japanese acknowledgement of Russian 
sovereignty (an unlikely scenario) the only method of settlement will involve a 
compromise in which Russia perceives that it will maintain the moral, or more 
likely, the economic equivalent of territorial domination. This might take the form 
of the initial proposal of Boris Yeltsin, who originally suggested that a free economic 
zone with joint protectorate status might provide an adequate solution. Given the 
current conditions of the Japanese and Russian economies and fishing industries, 
the Japanese would have the clear relative advantage in such an agreement. But if 
Yeltsin were to gain concessions from the Japanese that at a minimum give the 
perception of Russian dominance, a deal could be struck. 
78As of the time of this writing (December 1994) Russia continues to "talk 
around" the issue in its dialogue with Japan. In November 1994 talks in Tokyo, 
Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets refused to place the Kuril 
Islands on the agenda, although he did inform the Japanese Foreign Minister that 
the islands' future must be settled according to the principles of "law and justice." 
Soskovets did agree that there should be full-scale negotiations on fishing rights in 
the area. See RFE/RL Daily Report, 29 November 1994. 
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Hypothesis 8. Foreign policy will pursue one of the following methods in seeking to 
establish or maintain a "balance" in the international order: divide and rule, 
compensation, armament, alliance. 
This hypothesis is upheld. Although it is difficult to discern the application 
of these methods in the Kurils case, it is nonetheless clear that Russia wants to 
maintain a presence on the Pacific Rim, and more specifically does not wish to yield 
to Japanese claims in the Kurils, as a means of containing the threat of Japanese 
expansion and growing influence over the Russian Far East. Russia is in somewhat 
of a quandary, needing the support of the strong Japanese economy for the 
development of reforms in Russia, especially in the Far East. However, Russia is 
wary of the development of too much Japanese influence over the region, given 
Japan's historical interest in expansion to the Asian mainland, and its traditional 
interest in the exploitation of maritime resources in Russian waters. In light of this 
perspective, Russia will likely pursue a balanced approach to relations with Japan, 
encouraging investment and the development of joint business ventures, while 
maintaining a highly visible presence in the region as a means of counterbalancing 
any increased Japanese influence in the Pacific Northwest. This means, above all, 
maintaining control of the Kuril Islands. 
All four balance of power hypotheses were upheld in the Kurils Islands 
dispute test case; the balance of power explanatory theory is a clear "winner'' in this 
test case, demonstrating greater explanatory power than the theory of strategic 
culture. 
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V. TEST CASE: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA 
A. TEST CASE DISCUSSION 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian Federation Foreign 
Minister Andrei Kozyrev quickly proclaimed a pro-Western policy. He addressed 
the Russian people in a 2 January 1992 newspaper article and shared with them his 
vision of foreign policy in the new era then dawning. He stressed the need for 
"fruitful cooperation" with the United States; he went so far as to refer to the West 
an "Russia's natural allies."l He obviously sought to distance Russia from previous 
Soviet policies of confrontation and competition with the West. Kozyrev stated, 
"We must have an active foreign policy and diplomacy that can 
use international recognition to secure our economic admission to the 
world community and that can use this to secure assistance in meeting 
Russia's internal needs."(Emphasis added)2 
There was definitely a desire to improve Russia's image in the international 
community, but the real motivation for pursuing a policy consistent with the 
Western approach was economics. Boris Yeltsin's government desperately needed 
financial support from the G-7 nations to fuel reform at home.3 This staunchly pro-
Western policy immediately drew criticism from conservative quarters in Russia.4 
Western analysts were quick to identify the extensive Russian interests and 
influence in the Balkans, and to note the affect that Russian interests in the region 
1Jzvestia, as reported in FBIS, 9 April1992, pp. 34-35. 
2FBIS, 9 April1992. 
3Vera Tolz, ''The Burden of the Imperial Legacy," RFE/RL Research Report, 
Vol. 2, No. 20, 14 May 1993, p. 45. 
4Allen Lynch and Reneo Lukic, "Russian Foreign Policy: Still Travelling a 
Rocky Road," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 44, 5 November 1993, p. 29. 
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had on Russia's Balkan policy. Some noted that Russia [like Greece] also had 
traditional ties to Serbia, which had the effect of paralyzing or delaying forceful 
action (on the part of the West) in several instances.s Also,"post-Soviet foreign 
policy toward the Balkans has been affected as much by domestic claims [in Russia] 
made on behalf of Serbia as by the international aspects of the Yugoslav wars."6 
From 18 May to 27 May 1992, Kozyrev traveled to the former Yugoslavia and 
attempted to broker a cease fire among the warring factions. Although a cease fire 
was proclaimed, it quickly broke down.7 Immediately after these events Russian 
resistance to the imposition of sanctions against the rump Yugoslavia was 
withdrawn and Russia voted in the United Nations Security Council on 30 May 
1992 to support sanctions. The change in position was attributed to a realization that 
Russia was unable to broker a peace in the Balkans and would no longer tolerate 
Serbian aggression.s 
In June 1992 the Russian newspaper Den obtained a copy of a classified memo 
from the Russian ambassador to the United Nations, Yurii Vorontsov, which stated 
that Moscow should support sanctions, and that Russia must not be associated with 
Milosevic especially on the eve of a summit with the United States. Kozyrev 
implicitly conceded that the document was accurate.9 This revelation fueled 
criticism of Russian foreign policy, because the Russian actions were portrayed by 
conservatives and nationalists as an abandonment of Russian support for their 
5John Fenske, "The West and 'The Problem from Hell,"' Current History, 
Vol. 92, No. 577, p. 355. 
6Lynch and Lukic, p. 26. 
7Suzanne Crow, "Russia's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis," RFE/RL 
Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 30, p. 31. 
8Ibid., p. 32. 
9Jbid. 
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Slavic Orthodox brethren in Serbia. It was a return of the Panslav argument that 
Russia had historically supported and needed to protect its Slavic brothers and 
coreligionists in the Balkans.l o 
On 10 July 1992, at a C.S.C.E. ministerial meeting in Helsinki, Russia 
participated in a condemnation rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for its 
military actions in other former Yugoslav repsublics. At this time Yeltsin also called 
for the creation of a rapid reaction force, ostensibly to enter the former Yugoslavia to 
establish and enforce a truce. In July 1992 Kozyrev held meetings with rump 
Yugoslav leader Milan Panic and encouraged Panic to radically alter Yugoslavia's 
course to one of peace and democracy .11 
Russia recognized the Republic of Macedonia on 5 August 1992, a move that 
was a blow to Serbian interests and was meant to be a show of support for 
Bulgaria.l2 On 13 August 1992, Russia supported United Nations resolutions 770 
and 771, which approved the use of military force to ensure the supply of 
humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Hercegovina, and which permitted the use of that force 
to gain access to detention camps in Serbia and Montenegro, although at the same 
time Russia lobbied other Security Council members to allow the rump Yugoslavia 
to assume Yugoslavia's seat.13 On 19 September 1992 Russia supported the United 
Nations Security Council resolution referring to the end of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.14 These actions indicated an overall return to Realpolitik: Russia was 
1 Olbid., P· 35. 
111bid., p. 31. 
12Crow, "Russia and the Macedonia Question," RFE I RL Research Report, 
Vol. 1, No. 45, 13 November 1992, p. 36. 
13Crow, "Reading Moscow's Policies Toward the Rump Yugoslavia," RFE/RL 
Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 44, 6 November 1992, p. 14. 
141bid., p. 15. 
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ultimately willing to sacrifice cultural and historical interests in Serbia in order to 
strengthen relations with Bulgaria and to demonstrate its ability to cooperate with 
the West.lS 
Throughout 1992 Kozyrev denied that Russia had surrendered its initiative 
and independence in foreign policy in the interest of gaining Western support. At 
the end of the first year of Russian independence, however, it had become obvious 
that Western financial aid was not going to come, at least not in the amount 
anticipated, and Kozyrev began proclaiming a foreign policy that was more 
independent of Western influence and more in line with Russian national interests 
as defined in the domestic political arena. 
In December 1992 conservative member of parliament charged in Pravda that 
Russia lost $16 billion in 1992 as a result of the United Nations sanctions against 
Yugoslavia, Libya, and Iraq. While Kozyrev rejected the loss of trade argument, he 
nonetheless called for the lifting of sanctions, because these sanctions only served to 
isolate Serbia and Montenegro from the international community.16 
As was noted in Chapter III, on December 14, 1992, Kozyrev delivered a 
speech at a ministerial meeting of the C.S.C.E. in Stockholm, Sweden in which he 
announced a shift in Russian foreign policy, and then railed against Western 
intervention in the successor states of the Soviet Union, and further declared that 
Moscow might use military force and economic pressure to reassert control over the 
former Soviet republics. With respect to the Balkan conflict, Kozyrev proclaimed 
Slavic solidarity with Serbia and demanded an end to sanctions against that nation. 
He promised that the Serbs would have the full support of "Great Russia." Despite 
Kozyrev's claim that he was "bluffing," Russian foreign policy regarding Bosnia 
became more assertive after his speech. 
15Crow, "Russia and the Macedonia Question," p. 37. 
16Crow, "Russia Adopts a More Active Policy," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 
2, No. 12, 19 March 1993, p. 3. 
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The day after Kozyrev's speech Viktor Chernomyrdin, at the time perceived a 
to be a political conservative, succeeded committed reformer Yegor Gaidar as Prime 
Minister of the Russian Federation. On 16 December, the Security Council assumed 
responsibility for formulating Russian foreign policy, a move that isolated Kozyrev 
and, given the swing of the Prime Minister's chair in the Council of Ministers, 
appeared to give conservatives considerably more power in implementing their 
foreign policy agenda. Three days after Kozyrev's speech, on 17 December, the 
Russian parliament passed a resolution which called for the extension of sanctions 
to all three parties in the Bosnian conflict, demanded that Russia use its veto power 
to prevent the United Nations Security Council from authorizing any military 
activity in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and which called for humanitarian aid to rump 
Yugoslavia. Observers quickly noted the increasing role of Russian domestic politics 
in the formulation of Russian foreign policy.17 
In January 1993 Yeltsin complained that the United States tended to "dictate" 
policy regarding Iraq and Yugoslavia and indicated that Russian interests did not 
always coincide with U. S. interests. Observers noted specific reasons why Russia 
signalled a change in policy at this particular time: the Russian domestic political 
environment was changing to a more conservative (and more nationalistic) bent; 
the nature of the Balkan conflict was changing (at the time war had resumed in 
Croatia, and a military no-fly zone had been imposed); and there appeared to be a 
weakening of Western consensus concerning policy in Bosnia.18 
On 18 February 1993 the Russian parliament again passed a resolution on the 
Bosnian conflict, which called for the easing of sanctions against Serbia and the 
imposition of sanctions against Croatia. Russian foreign ministry officials also 
declared Russian opposition to the lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia-
17Crow, "Russia Adopts a More Active Policy," pp. 3-4. 
18Ibid., p. 3. 
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Hercegovina, an action proposed by Muslim governments and which had gained 
some support in some Western states, notably the U. 5.19 
In February 1993 Russia proposed the following eight point plan for the 
resolution of the conflict: 
1. Halt all fighting. 
2. Adopt the Vance-Owen Plan, which called for the establishment of ten 
autonomous provinces based on ethnic divisions. 
3. Lift sanctions against Serbia after it endorsed the Vance-Owen Plan. 
4. Establish a United Nations peacekeeping force. 
5. include Russian troops in that U. N. force. 
6. Allow NATO to participate in the operations. 
7. Introduce stricter controls over the Bosnian arms embargo. 
8. Initiate war crimes investigations20 
On 2 March 1993 Russia announced that it was willing to support 
humanitarian aid air drops over Bosnia-Hercegovina, and denied charges of secret 
arms deals with the Serbians.21 The balance of 1993 saw a decrease in Russian 
initiatives and general support for Western policies. 
In March 1994 Russian efforts to resolve the conflict again increased, both in 
concert with Western powers and on a unilateral basis. On 7 March 1994, Russia co-
sponsored a United Nations Security Council resolution which coordinated a 
number of measure's designed to maintain the truce around Sarajevo22 and on 25 
March Russia sent 100 paratroopers to participate in United Nations peacekeeping 
operations.23 Meanwhile, on 31 March Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy 
19Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
20Ibid. 
21Ibid., p. 5. 
22FBIS, 7 March 1994. 
23FBIS, 25 March 1994. 
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Churkin announced the successful negotiation of a cease fire between Serbs and 
Croats in Krijina.24 In early April 1994 Russia announced that it would send an 
additional 300 troops to Bosnia-Hercegovina for peacekeeping duty.25 
Still, Russia persisted in its efforts to cultivate influence with the Serbs. In 
April 1994, in response to a Serbian artillery attack on U.N. positions in the town of 
Gorazde, the U.N. responded by calling in an air strike on the Serbian positions. 
The Russian response to this turn of events included what can only be called a 
defense of Serbian actions. On 17 April1994, Kozyrev stated, II • •• after 
provocations from a Muslim warring group in Gorazde, the Serbs started using 
heavy artillery against the town, including the site where U.N. observers were 
deployed."26 Note that the Russians were careful to qualify the Serbian action as a 
response to a Muslim attack. Kozyrev expressed the Russian opinion that NATO air 
strikes only made matters worse, and that II ••• every step by the Serb side will be 
accompanied by appropriate, decisive pressure on our part about the lifting of 
sanctions."27 Thus in the immediate aftermath of Serbian artillery widely reported 
and condemned in the rest of the world Russia continued to pursue the lifting of 
sanctions against Serbia. Kozyrev would later assert that the NATO need to resort to 
force confirmed that Russia held the key to conflict resolution in Bosnia: 
"[After the NATO bombing raid in Bosnia] it became 
immediately apparent that Russia could not and should not be 
excluded from the common efforts to regulate the conflict in the 
24FBIS, 31 March 1994. 
2SFBIS, 1 April1994. 
26FBIS, 17 April 1994. 
27FBIS, 17 April 1994. 
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Balkans, a region where Russia has longtime interests and 
influence."28 
As a postscript to this discussion, in late November 1994 a UN-backed NATO 
airstrike was conducted against a Krajina Serb airfield. This strike was initially 
supported by Moscow, although Kozyrev subsequently commented that NATO 
airstrikes should not become a common occurance and that such actions in the 
future would prompt the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping forces from Bosnia. 
He also made the following statement: "We were assured that the strike was a 
preventative action and not a punishment. Let us hope it was really so."29 
Duplicity continues in the Russian policy regarding Bosnia. 
B. HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
1. Strategic Culture 
Hypothesis 1. States will have a preoccupation with security, demonstrating 
particular concern regarding loss of strategic depth, or the reduction of space 
between the frontiers and the heartland. 
This hypothesis is not upheld in this particular test case, nor does this test 
case provide a tough test for the hypothesis. Mikhail Gorbachev' s policy of 
peristroika meant the end of conformity to the Soviet system in the Eastern 
European bloc, which lead to dissolution of the communist systems of the Eastern 
bloc states, and to the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact. By the time of the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union itself, the Eastern European states were no longer part of the 
Soviet empire. The frontier had already been "rolled back" from the Iron Curtain to 
the borders of the Soviet Union proper. If there were a sense of loss of stretegic 
28Andrei V. Kozyrev, ''The Lagging Partnership," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 
3, May /June 1994, p. 63. 
29RFE/RL Daily Report, 23 November 1994. 
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depth in Eastern Europe, it occurred in 1989, before the period defined in this test 
case. 
Furthermore, Yugoslavia was a special case within the body of communist 
states. Yugoslavia broke from the Soviet sphere of influence in 1948; any sense of 
loss experienced by the Soviets at the departure of Yugoslavia from the Cominform 
was long since past. The Soviets had a very limited, measured response to 
Yugoslavia's break in relations when it first occurred, especially when <;ompared the 
Soviet response to Czechoslavakian attempts to reform in 1968. 
Hypothesis 2 States will pursue expansion as a means of gaining or regaining 
secure borders. 
This hypothesis is not upheld. By 1992 the former Yugoslav republics lay well 
beyond the frontier of the Russian Federation, or even the frontier of the former 
Soviet Union. In 1992 Russian concern for establishing secure borders were focused 
much closer to home than Yugoslavia. If Russian influence or control again 
extends into the Balkans, closer to Serbia, then a reevaulation of this hypothesis 
may be in order. 
Hypothesis 3. States will appeal to nationalistic sentiment as a means of garnering 
public support for foreign policy objectives. 
This hypothesis is upheld and composes the strongest argument for strategic 
culture as a foundation for analyzing Russian policy regarding the current Bosnian 
conflict. There is a historical precedent for the use of Russian nationalistic 
sentiment as a support for foreign policy objectives: the rise of Panslavism as a 
political and social force in Russia. At its inception, Panslavism had been a vague 
notion of cultural community among all Slavs. The term was first used by a Slovak 
intellectual and applied to an intellectual and cultural Slav renaissance in the first 
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half of the nineteenth century.30 The Russian idea of Panslavism was far more 
aggressive: it could be defined as the furthering of the Tsar's ambitions in the 
Balkans.31 Russian Panslavists saw Russia as the natural protector of all the Slavic 
peoples, and aspired to "liberate" the various Slavic nations from the Ottoman and 
later the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and then include them in the immediate 
Russian sphere of influence. Russia, in their eyes, was the "mother and protector 
for these peoples."32 There was a second group of intellectuals within Russia, 
closely linked with the Panslavs, that sought Russian influence in the Balkans based 
on religious ties. These first two groups manifest the cultural aspect of Russian 
strategic goals. Yet a third group viewed the most important question of Russian 
foreign policy to be the dispensation of power and decisive influence at the Turkish 
Straits, which would in turn lead to supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean.33 
This group took a decidedly Realpolitik perspective. 
Political and extreme Panslavism as it evolved in Russia was influenced by 
key intellectuals. Nikolai Danilevski (1822-85), for example, was an expert in the 
field of natural sciences, and he drew from Darwinism to define the goal of 
Panslavism to be the formation of a Slav confederation separate from Europe and 
under the hegemony and protection of Russia to which all Slavs would rally after 
acquiring their political freedom.34 To such extremists, Russia was a cause rather 
30Charles T. Katsainos, The Theory and Practice of Russian Panslavism In 
Light of Russia's Expansionist Policies in the Balkans, Georgetown University 
Dissertation, Washington, DC, 1951, p. vii. 
31Robert C. Binkley, Realism and Nationalism (New York: Harper & Brothers 
Publishers, 1935), pp. 28-29. 
32George F. Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order: Franco-
Russian Relations, 1875-1890 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 28. 
33Ibid., p. 29. 
34Binkley, pp. 28-29. 
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than a nation, beyond geopolitics, impelled by faith, and bonded by armed force.35 
This greater Slav federation envisioned by the Panslavs was extensive and 
encompassed nearly all of the Balkan Peninsula and Eastern Europe.36 
Influenced by Panslavist opinion in society, the Russian public reacted 
strongly to the brutal Turkish efforts to suppress Serbian uprisings in 1875; several 
thousand volunteers joined the Serbian army to fight the Turks. Tensions between 
Russia and the Turks mounted and the two sides declared war in April 1877.37 
Russia crossed the Danube in June 1877, won decisive· victories and began an 
advance on Constantinople. After defeating Turkish forces at Plevna in December 
1877 the Russian army resumed its march to Constantinople and was approaching 
the city when the Treaty of San Stefano was signed in March 1878. Russia made 
critical gains in this treaty, including additional territory in border regions in the 
Caucasus and Bessarabia. Rumania won independence and control over Dobrudja, 
Serbia and Montenegro gained independence and extensive territory including 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, and an large and autonomous Bulgaria was created.38 San 
Stefano was seen as the "triumph of Russian Panslavism" 39 and its conclusion 
effectively meant the end of Ottoman control in Europe, except for Thrace, Albania, 
35Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 143. 
36Katsainos, pp. 76-77. 
37Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (New York: Oxford 
University Press), p. 387. 
38George Vemadsky, A History of Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1969), p. 227. 
39Katsainos, p. viii. 
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and (nominally) Bulgaria.40 However, the Conference of Berlin saw a nascent 
coalition rise to oppose Russian gains at the expense of the Turks.41 
As was the case in the tsarist period when Panslavist influences were 
manifest in Russian foreign policy, the Russians today appear to using domestic 
appeals to nationalist sentiment and cultural affinity in their Balkan policy. These 
tactics have three purposes: (1) build domestic support for their foreign policies; (2) 
justify their interest and involvement in the Ball<ans to the international 
community; and (3), appeal to Serbian public and official opinion on the basis of 
similar nationalist sentiment and cultural affinity. It must be noted that thus far the 
Russian Federation has not pursued a policy of territorial aggrandizement as the 
Panslavists in tsarist Russia sought. 
Nonetheless, two comments by Kozyrev made in July 1994 confirm Russia's 
commitment to emphasize cultural ties as a means of justifying continued interests 
in the Balkans and to cultivate influence among the Serbs. Kozyrev stated that " ... 
it seems to be a common belief, that Russia has a particular interest in or particular 
historical ties with the Serbs. That's probably true."42 He then made an even 
stronger statement in the same interview which indicates that the Russian 
government is now listening to public opinion. He stated that " ... it is a fact of life 
that a considerable part of Russian public opinion believes that Serbs are the closest 
40Ferdinand Schevill, A History of the Balkans (New York: Dorset Press, 
1991), p. 364. 
41Gordon Craig, Europe Since 1815 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich 
College Publishers, 1974), p. 187. 
4Zfherese Raphael, Claudia Rosett, and Suzanne Crow, "An Interview with 
Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 
28, 15 July 1994, p. 36. 
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people to Russia in the Balkans, and they have to be protected. We have to take that 
into consideration." 43 
Hypothesis 4. Foreign policy will be formulated at the highest levels; the real 
foreign policy decisions will be made by the national leader and a close circle of 
advisors. Executive branches ministries and departments will be relegated to a 
support function. 
This hypothesis is not upheld. If anything, the review of government 
statements and the criticism of conservative and nationalist politicians over 
Russian foreign policy provides strong evidence that domestic political forces have 
had a definite influence on the Russian policy regarding Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
Despite Kozyrev's denial, there has been a shift in Russian policy that corresponds 
with harsh criticism for the government and its handling of foreign policy. 
Analysts have noted that by the end of 1992 Russian domestic politics had assumed 
"cardinal importance" in the pattern of Russian policy in Bosnia-Hercegovina.44 
Once again consider Kozyrev's comment concerning the factor of public opinion. 
Decisions may ultimately be made at the highest levels of goevernment, but it also 
seems clear from this case that these decisions are increasingly influenced by a wide 
variety of factors, including general public opinion. This is a change from the 
pattern established in the tsarist and Soviet periods. 
In the overall evaluation of the strategic culture hypotheses in this test case, 
only one of the four hypotheses was upheld. 
43lbid. 
44Lynch and Lukic, p. 32. 
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2. Balance of Power 
Hypothesis 5. States will in principle focus on the establishment and maintenance 
of prestige, both at home and abroad. 
This hypothesis is upheld. Despite its support for United Nations approved 
sanctions against Serbia, Russia has continued to indicate that it wants to serve as 
Serbia's protector.45 Russia has called for the lifting of sanctions against Serbia and 
Montenegro and pressed for the continuation of the arms embargo against Bosnia-
Hercegovina. Russia has also repeated attempted to broker cease fires and peace 
agreements in Bosnia, and for good reason. In approaching the Serbs the Russians 
can make themselves over to be a benevolent power that is willing to get involved, 
willing to intercede on behalf of their Slavic Orthodox brethren. It is also to the 
benefit of the Russians that the Serbs have no where else to turn in the 
international community, with the possible exception of Greece. 
Playing up the role of protector of the Serbs has a strong domestic appeal in 
Russia and helps Yeltsin and his government considerably in their fight to maintain 
credibility and appeal among more conservative constituents in the Duma and the 
general public. In short, supporting the Serbs or even merely appearing to support 
the Serbs, is a good public relations move for the Yeltsin government. 
Lastly, if Russia is ever able to broker a cease fire that holds, they will gamer 
considerable attention and respect from the West, which thus far has proven at least 
as ineffective in coaxing an agreement from the warring factions. A Russian-
engineered peace would confirm Russian claims of a special influence in the 
Balkans in the eyes of the West, and would demonstrate a diplomatic skill that 
would contribute significantly to Russian prestige in the international community. 
Hypothesis 6. In foreign policy, whenever geographically possible, state expansion 
will have as one goal the acquisition and protection of access to the sea. 
45Crow, "Reading Moscow's Policies Toward the Rump Yugoslavia," p. 13. 
114 
This hypothesis is not upheld. It must be aknowledged, however, that this 
test case does not provide a tough test for the hypothesis. At the time the Soviet 
Union's dissolution in December 1991, both the territory of Yugoslavia and the 
adjacent Adriatic Sea were far from the Russian frontier and the Russian interest. 
Furthermore, Serbia proper is landlocked and Montenegro has limited access to the 
sea. Therefore, if Russia were cultivating interests and influence in Serbia and 
Montenegro it would be difficult to correlate that interest with a goal of acquiring 
additional access to the sea. 
Hypothesis 7. States will resolutely refuse to suffer territorial loss without a 
struggle, unless there is an equitable exchange of territory (equitable from the 
national perspective) or the strong potential for the development of the economic 
or moral equivalence of territorial domination. 
This hypothesis is upheld, although by itself it would not provide strong 
support for Realpolitik-based foreign policy. Despite claims of cultural interests in 
the Balkans, the Russians have espressed no interest in territorial claims in the 
region. Russia does, however, claim to hold the key to peace in the region and that 
can be seen as an attempt to gain "moral domination." Consider once again 
Kozyrev's statement following the NATO air strike on Serbian artillery positions 
near Gorazde: 
"[After the NATO bombing raid in Bosnia] it became 
immediately apparent that Russia could not and should not be 
excluded from the common efforts to regulate the conflict in the 
Balkans, a region where Russia has longtime interests and 
influence."46 
46Kozyrev, p. 66. 
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Hypothesis 8. Foreign policy will pursue one of the following methods in seeking to 
establish or maintain a "balance" in the international urder: divide and rule, 
compensation, armament, alliance. 
This hypothesis is upheld. At every turn Russia insists that it must heard in 
the important questions, that the new world order is not one that can be dominated 
by the United States or any other single power or alliance of powers. Kozyrev states 
the point clearly: 
" ... the international order in the 21st century will not be a Pax 
Americana or any other version of bipolar or monopolar dominance. 
The United States does not have the capability to rule alone. Russia, 
while in a period of transitional difficulties, retains the inherent 
characteristics of a great power (technology, resources, weaponry)."47 
Russians believe that they are a great power with interests in Europe and 
therefore have a right to be heard. Kozyrev made this point in his Stockholm 
speech: "While sticking to the course of joining Europe, we are distinctly conscious 
that our traditions are in large part, if not fundamentally, oriented toward Europe." 
That point is clear in the case of Russian foreign policy in Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
Three of four balance of power hypotheses were upheld in this test case. It 
must be noted that in this particular test case, Hypothesis 7 alone would not stand as 
a validation of balance of power theory. In concert with the other upheld 
hypotheses, however, Hypothesis 7 adds support to the balance of power theory. 
This comparative analysis is a clear "win" for balance of power theory, and 
demonstrates that the balance of power theory holds greater ~xplanatory power than 
the strategic culture theory in the examination of Russian foreign policy regarding 
Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis was to systematically employ two explanatory 
theories as tools for the study of foreign policy, and to test the two theories against 
one another to determine their relative explanatory power. 
In examining the results of the evaluation of the hypotheses in the three test 
cases, it is clear that balance of power theory emerges as the clear "winner" when 
compared with strategic cultural theory. The family of four hypotheses derived 
from the two explanatory theories were evaluated in each of the three test cases, 
thus yielding a total of twelve evaluation points for the two theories. In the case of 
strategic culture, the hypotheses were upheld in six of twelve opportunities. By 
comparison, in the balance of power case the hypotheses were upheld in ten of 
twelve opportunities. Both theories have great utility in the study of Russian 
foreign policy, but balance of power is the more powerful explanatory theory of the 
two. 
A few significant problems were encountered in this thesis. In reviewing 
Russian policy statements regarding the three test cases it became obvious that in 
analysing foreign policy statements by members of the Russian government used in 
this study, it was extremely difficult to differentiate between policy statements and 
posturing statements. In some cases the statements chosen for analysis could have 
been a deliberate attempt to misstate a point, whether that deception be for domestic 
political purposes or for diplomatic maneuver. It is simply impossible to discern 
intent from the text of such statements, unless the spokesman later chose to reveal 
his intent. There were no instances of this last possibility, and therefore all 
statements had to be evaluated based on an assumption that they were valid 
reflections of Russian foreign policy. 
Some of the hypotheses require additional consideration. It is difficult to 
differentiate between Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 5 even though they were derived 
from different theories; the difference between appeals to "nationalistic sentiment'' 
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and the pursuit of "prestige" is a fine point, especially in the domestic political 
arena. This is largely because one of the fundamental themes of Russian 
nationalistic sentiment is the notion that "Russia is a great power." As a result of 
this inability to distinguish between an appeal to nationalistic sentiment and the 
pursuit of prestige, in each of the three test cases both Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 5 
were upheld, and would most likely be upheld or not upheld in tandem, regardless 
of the test case chosen. Hypothesis 4 proved inconclusive in two of the three test 
cases, and was disproved in the third case not by direct evidence, but rather by 
deduction. Several of the "other theories" discussed in Chapter II were dismissed 
because they were predicated on a level of knowledge concerning Russian 
governmental organization and operation that is not yet available; this hypothesis 
suffered from a similar dearth of information. Its strength cannot be determined as 
of yet, and awaits increased knowledge of the workings of the decision-making 
mechanisms in Moscow. 
This thesis was designed to be illustrative in nature and the promising results 
of this analysis indicate that the examination of additional test cases is in order, so 
that the utility of strategic culture- and balance of power-based theories as 
foundations for the examination of Russian foreign policy might be further 
demonstrated. There are a large number of Russian foreign policy issues which 
could serve as excellent test cases. The following issues could serve as test cases and 
would be of interest: 
1. Recent diplomatic initiatives regarding Iraq. In October 1994 Iraq conducted a 
troop build-up along its border with Kuwait, which prompted widespread 
condemnation in the international community and led to the deployment of . 
American forces to the region. Foreign Minister Kozyrev met with Saddam 
Hussein on 13 October in an attempt to defuse the crisis. Kozyrev then visited the 
United Nations, and proposed that the U.N. lift sanctions against Iraq in exchange 
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for Iraqi recognition of the Kuwaiti border. Kozyrev was critical of the Iraqi actions, 
but also stressed that "Iraq had no intention of invading [Kuwait]."1 
The Realpolitik-based reasons for attempting to defuse the situation and to 
gain influence in Iraq are fairly easy to see: Russian prestige in the international 
community would be enhanced through the peaceful resolution of a crisis; 
increased Russian interest and influence in the Persian Gulf might serve as an 
acceptable "exchange of territory" in light of the loss of influence in Eastern Europe; 
Russian influence in Iraq might serve to "balance" U. S. influence and presence in 
the Gulf. However, certain financial motivations must also be acknowledged; Iraq 
owes Russia some eight billion dollars, and Boris Yeltsin' s domestic position would 
be strengthened were Russia able to collect on that debt. The strategic culture-based 
reasons are less clear; analysis of this recently-developed issue might reveal such 
cultural influences. 
2. The expansion of NATO, and particularly NATO expansion into Eastern Europe. 
Russia has not prevented Eastern European states from pursuing membership in 
NATO and has itself signalled an intention to participate in the Partnership for 
Peace program, but its ultimate goals regarding integration into NATO and its view 
of NATO membership for Eastern European states is still unclear. As was 
demonstrated in the "near abroad" test case, the fact that Russia "allowed" the 
fourteen other Soviet republics to proclaim their independence does not deny the 
existence of a Russian sentiment over the "loss" of empire, nor does it deny the 
existence of a Russian desire to reassert itself in the "near abroad." Given that 
Eastern Europe has long been considered to fall within the Russian sphere of 
influence, an analysis of Russian policy would most likely reveal elements of ~oth 
balance of power- and strategic culture-driven thinking that are resistant to the 
notion of NATO extending membership to, say, Poland or Hungary. Kozyrev's 
repudiation of the 1 December 1994 decision by NATO foreign ministers to pursue 
lRFE/RL Daily Report, 18 October 1994. 
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expansion, and Russia's corresponding decision to defer participation in Partnership 
for Peace provide strong support for this view.2 
In the examination of the "near abroad" test cases, a number of separate and 
distinct policy issues were examined in an attempt to demonstrate the overarching 
affect of the concept of the "near abroad" on Russian strategic thinking. However, a 
more detailed analysis of these issues would also be of great benefit. The following 
are some of the more prominent issues: 
3. The continuing ethnic conflict in Nagomyy-Karabakh. 
4. Relations with the Baltic states as a whole. 
5. The ethnic conflict in the Trans-Dniester region of Moldova. 
6. The disposition of the Black Sea Fleet. 
7. The civil war in Tadjikistan. 
8. Abkhazian efforts to gain independence from Georgia. 
Lastly, the study of Russian bilateral relations with certain countries could 
provide a tough test for the comparative analysis of strategic culture- and balance of 
power- based theories. These bilateral relations could include the following issues: 
9. Contemporary bilateral relations with any of the former Soviet republics, but 
especially with Ukraine. 
10. Contemporary bilateral relations with other states that have previously been 
considered to be in the Russian of Soviet sphere of influence, or in an area of 
particular interest to the Russians, or otherwise played a significant factor in 
Russian and Soviet foreign policy. Such countries might include the following: 
Finland, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Turkey, Germany, Japan and China. 
2RFE/RL Daily Report, 2 December 1994. 
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The utility of balance of power theory, and to a lesser extent, strategic culture 
theory, as bases for such analysis have been confirmed by this thesis, which has 
focused largely on prediction and explanation. But from this study one may also 
draw a general conclusion regarding a characteristic of contemporary Russian 
foreign policy. 
The Russian Federation appears to be returning to the tsarist strategy of 
pursuing interests on both the Realpolitik and cultural level. Russian policy 
regarding Bosnia serves as an example of this type of "two-pronged" attack. Russian 
imperial foreign policy before 1917 pursued both great power interests of prestige 
enhancement and power aggrandizement, and yet at the same time cultivated 
cultural and historical interests in the region, on the basis of ethnic and religious 
ties. Today, Russia continues to emphasize its ethnic and religious connections 
with Serbia, and likewise asserts that the conflict in Bosnia simply cannot be 
resolved, and action cannot be taken, without consultation with Russia. Given the 
opportunity, Russia will pursue the achievement of its national interests in terms of 
both cultural/historical interests and Realpolitik-based calculations. 
However, the strong performance of the balance of power theory relative to 
strategic culture theory suggests the possibility that if Russian balance of power-
based interests and strategic culture-based interests are in conflict, then Russia will 
sacrifice its cultural interests for the betterment of its balance of power interests. 
This was true in tsarist foreign policies, when in many instances Russia "traded" 
away the Serbs in treaties and negotiations in order to strengthen their position with 
respect to gaining control of the Turkish Straits and Constantinople. In 
contemporary Russian foreign policy, Russia has maintained that it must play .a 
special role as the guardian-sponsor of Serbia, but its voting record in the U.N. and 
the C.S.C.E. regarding sanctions against Serbia indicate a tendency to follow Western 
policy and thereby enhance its standing in the international community. Prestige is 
not so well-defined as an attempt to gain control of the Turkish Straits, but it is 
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nonetheless an important factor in the formulation of foreign policy in the Russian 
Federation-- more so than any culturally- or historically-based factor. The United 
States would do well to keep this in mind as it tries to understand Russian thinking 
in the post-Soviet era. 
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